From the facts set forth in the record, it appears that Mrs. Bullard, the movant, was without authority to intervene to have set aside the order involved in this proceeding, since she was not a party against whom such order was taken. Her motion was not lodged to set aside the stock assessment judgment taken against her in a proceeding to which she was a party, but was lodged to set aside the order authorizing the sale of said judgment to S. J. T. Quick, entered in a proceeding in which she was not a party; and was lodged under C. S., 600, which provides that: “The judge shall, upon such terms as may be just, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judg*511ment, order, verdict, or other proceeding taken against him, through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, . . .”
The order of Stack, J., authorizing the sale by the Commissioner of Banks of the stock assessment judgment, as provided by C. S., 218 (e) (7), was not an order taken against Mrs. Bullard. This order authorizing the sale of the stock assessment judgment affected only the liquidating agent and whomever purchased by virtue thereof, and so far as Mrs. Bullard was concerned, the order was res inter alios acta. In the sight of the law, at least, it matters not to the judgment debtor who the judgment creditor is. “Since a judgment is an assignable chose' in action,, the assignee takes it subject to and charged with all the equities which could be asserted against it in the hands of the assignor at the time of the assignment.” 15 E. C. L., 779.
In Smith v. New Bern, 73 N. C., 303, it was held that the remedy now provided under O. S., 600, is restricted to^ the parties aggrieved by the judgment or order sought to be set aside, and that the Superior Court had no power under O. O. P., 133, brought forward in part as C. S., 600,, to set aside a judgment or order once rendered upon motion of a stranger to the cause. This holding was reiterated in Edwards v. Phillips, 91 N. C., 355, wherein it was said: “No other person can complain as he (the defendant) alone is affected by it (the judgment). This is expressly held when the application is made under section 133 of O. O. P. (The Code, sec. 274), in the case of Smith v. New Bern, 73 N. C., 303.” See an interesting discussion of the general rule that strangers cannot have judgments vacated, annulled, or set aside in note to Tyler v. Aspinwall (Conn.), 54 L. R. A., 758, 768; also Rollins v. Henry, 78 N. C.,, 342, and Walton v. Walton, 80 N. C., 26.
Mrs. Bullard, the movant, makes the further contention that, since the liquidated bank has paid its depositors in full, any amount above $200.00 which could be obtained for the stock assessment judgment against her would inure to the benefit of the stockholders, of whom she is one, by way of credit on such judgments, and for that reason the order authorizing the sale of said judgment for $200 was against her interest and “taken against her,” and therefore entitled her to relief under C. S., 600. This contention is untenable for two reasons, first,, Mrs. Bullard, as a creditor of the bank, cannot question the manner of the disposition of the assets of the bank by the Commissioner as receiver of the bank, in the absence of any allegation of fraud, bad faith, or neglect on the part of the receiver, Bickley v. Green, 187 N. C., 772, 774; and, second, there is no allegation or finding of fact that the stock assessment judgment would bring more than $200.00 and costs if exposed to sale at public auction. In fact, the order of Alley, J., rather indicates that there would be no increase in the amount obtained for *512such judgment, since it provides that tbe judgment be sold to Mrs. Eullard for $200.00 in tbe event no bigber bid is made therefor at a resale.
Since we are of tbe opinion, and so bold, that tbe Superior Court was without authority to entertain tbe motion of Mrs. Bullard, upon which tbe order setting aside tbe order of Stack, J., was predicated, tbe order of Alley, J., is
Reversed.