May a husband ground an action for divorce, under C. S. 1659 (a), on his own criminal conduct towards his wife? The answer is, No. Teasley v. Teasley, 205 N. C., 604, 172 S. E., 191. Any other holding would be a reproach to the law. Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125, 173 S. E., 5. The decisions in Campbell v. Campbell, 207 N. C., 859, and Long v. Long, 206 N. C., 706, 175 S. E., 85, are not authorities to the contrary, for in neither of these cases was there a plea in bar based upon plaintiff's alleged criminal conduct towards the defendant.
“It is very generally held — universally, so far as we are aware — that an action never lies when a plaintiff must base his claim, in whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws of the State”—Hoke, J., in Lloyd v. R. R., 151 N. C., 536, 66 S. E., 604. In Waite's Actions and Defenses, Yol. 1, p. 43, the principle is broadly stated, as follows: “No principle of law is better settled than that which declares that an action cannot be maintained upon any ground or cause which the law declares to be illegal,” citing Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wallace, 447; Rolfe v. Delmar, 7 Rob., 80; Stewart v. Lothrop, 12 Gray, 52; Howard v. Harris, 8 Allen, 297; Pearce v. Brooks, L. R. 1 Exch., 213; Smith v. White, L. R. 1 Eq. Cases, 626.
To say that civil rights, enforceable through the courts, may inure to one out of his own violation of the criminal law, and against the very person injured, would be to blow hot and cold in the same breath, or, J anus-like, to look in both directions at the same time. The law is not interested in such double dealing or slight-o-f-hand performances; it sets, its face like flint in the opposite direction.
There was error in declining to hear the defendant's plea. Let the-verdict and judgment be set aside and the cause remanded for another hearing.
New trial.