“All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be joined as plaintiffs, either jointly, severally, or in the alternative. . . .” C. S., 455. The individual plaintiff had “an interest in the subject of the action” for that he owned the truck and the trailer alleged to have been damaged; and the corporate plaintiff had “an interest in the subject of the action” by reason of its lien upon said damaged truck.
“The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action, of legal or equitable nature, or both, where they all arise out of the same transaction, or transaction connected with the same subject of action.” C. S., 507 (1).
The cause of action of the individual plaintiff for damage to his truck, as well as the cause of action of the corporate plaintiff for the loss of his security by reason of the damage to said truck, both arose out of the same transaction or transaction connected with the same subject of action, namely, the damage to the same truck proximately caused by the same negligent act of the same agent of the defendant. Clearly both *265parties plaintiff bad an interest in tbe subject of tbis action and in obtaining tbe relief demanded. Neither of these statutes requires, by word or by implication, that tbe causes of action of tbe parties plaintiff shall be identical. Tbe first only requires that tbe respective parties plaintiff have “an interest in tbe subject of tbe action and in obtaining tbe relief demanded”; and tbe second only requires that tbe several causes of action shall “arise out of tbe same transaction, or transaction connected with tbe same subject of action.”
“. . . . Tbe fact that tbe interests .of plaintiffs are legally sever-able, or not common or identical, is no bar to their joinder where they have a common interest in tbe subject of tbe action and tbe relief sought.” 47 C. J., 59.
We conclude that bis Honor properly overruled tbe demurrer to tbe complaint.
We are also of tbe opinion that tbe demurrer to that portion of tbe complaint relating to damages sustained by tbe individual plaintiff by reason of loss of bis contract for tbe delivery of cotton upon tbe ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute such cause of action was properly overruled. In tbe first place, tbe complaint, when construed, as we are required to construe it liberally in behalf of tbe plaintiff, presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, Scott v. Ins. Co., 205 N. C., 38; and, in tbe second place, tbe ground of tbe demurrer is defective and cannot be sustained for that it does not specify wherein tbe complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute tbe cause of action, Elam v. Barnes, 110 N. C., 73; Griffin v. Bank, 205 N. C., 253.
Judgment overruling tbe demurrer is