The defendant assails the validity of the trial principally upon the ground: first, that the alleged contract of employment is too indefinite; and, second, that defendant’s agent’s authority to make such a contract, if made, is nonexistent and nonapparent.
The contract as established by the verdict is not void for indefiniteness. Stevens v. R. R., 187 N. C., 528, 122 S. E., 295; Fisher v. Lamber Co., 183 N. C., 485, 111 S. E., 857.
The law is stated in 39 C. J., 41, as follows: “It has been held further that the relinquishment of a present position in reliance on a promise *864to give permanent employment is a sufficient consideration for such a contract, that sucb a contract is not void as indefinite, or as wanting in mutuality because the employee is not bound to continue in the employer’s service, or because the employee might terminate the contract at will, although the employer is bound. And such a contract is not void for uncertainty, for lack of a stipulation as to the compensation, or character of the services to be rendered.”
The authority of the defendant’s agent to make the alleged contract was submitted in an issue to the jury and answered in the affirmative. Indeed, the agent’s own testimony is to the same effect. Proof of agency, as well as of its nature and extent, may be made by the direct testimony, but not by the extra-judicial declarations, of the alleged agent. Allen v. R. R., 171 N. C., 339, 88 S. E., 492; Sutton v. Lyons, 156 N. C., 3, 72 S. E., 4; Hill v. Bean, 150 N. C., 436, 64 S. E., 212; Machine Co. v. Seago, 128 N. C., 158, 38 S. E., 805; 1 R. C. L., 821.
The principle upon which Stephens v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 107, 75 S. E., 933, was decided is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
The record is free from reversible error, hence the verdict and judgment will be upheld.
SciiENCic, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.