Two questions of law are presented by the record.
1. Does the application of C. S., 1795, render incompetent the testimony of Wade Vannoy that his father-in-law, the deceased G. C. Green, gave a five-hundred-dollar wedding present to his wife, the plaintiff, Mabel Green Vannoy?
2. Does the application of said statute render incompetent the testimony of Mabel Green Vannoy that her father, G. C. Green, deceased, gave her sister, Ola Green Austin, deceased, a check for $500.00 as a wedding present?
Both questions must be answered in the negative. In considering the answer to the first question, it must be noted that Wade Vannoy had no interest in the event of the lawsuit; that is to say, he would get nothing of pecuniary value out of the lawsuit, however terminated. There is no evidence that Wade Vannoy and the plaintiff, Mabel Green *83Yannoy, have children, and the testimony of Wade Vannoy tended to show a transaction between the deceased G. C. Green and the wife of the witness. Moreover, the clerk found as a fact that the personal property of decedent was sufficient “to pay all debts, charges of administration and any alleged advancements which might be recovered by any of said parties against any other of said parties.” Consequently, the evidence of the husband was competent by virtue of the application of the principles applied in Hall v. Holloman, 136 N. C., 34, 48 S. E., 515; and Helsabeck v. Doub, 167 N. C., 205, 83 S. E., 241.
The testimony of Mabel Green Yannoy that her father, the deceased, gave $500.00 to her deceased sister, Ola Green Austin, as a wedding present was competent. This conclusion is established by various pronouncements of this Court, notably: Johnson v. Cameron, 136 N. C., 243, 48 S. E., 640; In re Mann, 192 N. C., 248, 134 S. E., 649; Barton v. Barton, 192 N. C., 453, 135 S. E., 296. The applicable principle was stated in the Johnson case, supra, as follows: “But here the witness testified as to no transaction or communication between herself and W. M. Cameron. It was a transaction between W. M. Cameron and her husband, and as to that she is a competent witness notwithstanding her interest. . . . This case does not turn upon the witness being a party or interested in the event — she is both. But the transaction with the deceased here testified to by a party to the action was not between the witness and the deceased, and hence by the terms of the statute and by the decisions . . . the witness was properly admitted to testify in regard thereto.”
There are certain exceptions to the charge of the trial judge, but an interpretation of the charge as a unit fails to disclose reversible error.
Affirmed.