(1) What duty does the law impose upon an employer with respect to furnishing particular tools or appliances to a workman in performing particular types of work?
(2) Was the evidence of certain injuries sustained by the witness Keeter, competent?
This case is built upon the theory that it was the duty of the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care to furnish goggles to the plaintiff. The leading goggle cases in this State are: Whitt v. Rand, 187 N. C., 805, 123 S. E., 84; Jefferson v. Raleigh, 194 N. C., 479, 140 S. E., 76. The facts in Whitt v. Band, supra, are almost identical with those in the present case. The standard of duty in such cases was stated as follows: “A perusal of our decisions on the subject will show that in order for liability to attach, in case of simple, everyday tools, it must appear, among other things that the injury has resulted from a lack of such tools or defects therein which the employer is required to remedy, in the proper and reasonable discharge of his duties, and that the lack or defect complained and made the basis of the charge is of a kind from which some appreciable and substantial injury may be reasonably expected to occur.” In the Jefferson case the legal standard of liability was expressed in thes^ words: “So, in the present case, if a lighter hammer or hack-saw, or goggles to protect the eyes of the workman, should have been provided in the exercise of that prevision which the law requires, or if a person of ordinary prudence could reasonably foresee or anticipate that injury would likely flow from the method employed, the defendant would be liable.”
Therefore, the court is of the opinion that the trial judge properly submitted the issue of negligence to the jury.
The second question of law involved, presents the familiar principle of the competency of evidence of similar injuries or occurrences. Obviously, in a broad and practical sense it is the duty of trial courts to *660try one case at the time. For this reason the law has built a hedge or fence designed to exclude, except under proper and pertinent circumstances, the “lugging in” of extraneous and collateral matters. The limitation of the competency of such evidence is clearly stated in Perry v. Bottling Co., 196 N. C., 690, 146 S. E., 805, as follows: “Evidence of similar occurrences is admitted where it appears that all the essential physical conditions on the two occasions were identical; for under such circumstances the observed uniformity of nature raises an inference that like causes will produce like results, even though there may be some dissimilarity of conditions in respect to a matter which cannot reasonably be expected to have affected the result.” See, also, Perry v. Bottling Co., 196 N. C., 175, 145 S. E., 14; Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N. C., 623, 169 S. E., 194. The same limitation is stated in Conrad v. Shuford, 174 N. C., 719, 94 S. E., 424, in which the Court said: “But we base the relevancy of this testimony upon the ground that the conditions and circumstances were substantially the same and the two occurrences were separated only by a very brief interval of time,” etc. The testimony of witness Fleeter discloses neither the substantial identity of circumstances nor proximity of time which the law contemplates, and consequently such testimony should have been excluded.
There are certain exceptions to the charge, but as a new trial must be awarded it is deemed inadvisable to undertake to anticipate the course of a future hearing.
SciceNOK, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.