There are a number of decisions of this Court to the effect that compliance with charter provisions similar to those above set out is a condition precedent to the institution of an action against a municipal corporation for the recovery of damages — the object of the provision being to give the municipal authorities timely opportunity to investigate claims while the evidence may be procured and preserved and to prevent fraud and imposition. Cresler v. Asheville, 134 N. C., 311; Pender v. Salisbury, 160 N. C., 363; Hartsell v. Asheville, 164 N. C., 193. Both allegations and proof of notice are necessary. Pender v. Salisbury, supra. The plaintiff neither alleged nor proved that she had given the required notice.
There is an exception to the rule if the claimant has been mentally or physically incapacitated to comply with the provisions of the charter. Terrell v. Washington, 158 N. C., 282. It is obvious in the present case that the plaintiff was not prevented from presenting her claim by reason of mental or physical incapacity between the time of the alleged injury and the institution of her action. There is evidence that her mental and physical condition was good, and she testified that she had declined to bring suit earlier because it would “have been of no use to sue if she recovered right away.” Meantime she was not confined to her bed and had occasion from time to time to leave her home and consult with her physicians. In Hartsell v. Asheville, 166 N. C., 633, it was said all that is necessary is that there should be reasonable opportunity within the period intervening between the injury and the institution of the action in which the plaintiff would be able to give the required notice.
Affirmed.