The questions involved: (1) Was the plaintiff at the time of his injury, an employee of the defendant bank? (2) Did his injury, by accident arise out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act? We think both of the questions must be answered in the affirmative. As to the first question: It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction that if there is any sufficient competent evidence to support the findings of fact of the Industrial Commission, although this Court may disagree with such findings, the Court will sustain the findings of fact made by the Commission. Massey v. Board of Education 204 N. C., 193 (196).
In Hodges v. Mortgage Co., 201 N. C., 701 (706), it is said: “Hence, one of the fundamental tests of the right to compensation is not the *219title of tbe injured person, but tbe nature and quality of tbe act be is performing at tbe time of tbe injury. Tbis theory is undoubtedly sound. Certainly it is supported by tbe weight of authority.” Hunter v. Auto Co., 204 N. C., 723 (725).
It is found as a fact by tbe Industrial Commission and approved by tbe court below: “According to tbe testimony of tbe claimant he performed ordinary detailed and even manual labor and such as would be required of any other bank employee and at tbe time of bis injury, be was following tbe express directions of bis superior officer. Even if tbis were not true, it would seem that tbe defendant insurance carrier, having received tbe name of tbis claimant as an employee of tbe defendant bank and having collected premiums based upon bis payroll, has waived any question as to tbe status of tbe employee and it ought to be estopped to now claim that be is not an employee but tbe managing bead of tbe corporation, and we so bold.”
In Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 199 N. C., 236 (240), we find: “Tbe defendant, Travelers Insurance Company, having been paid tbe premium by defendant Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., employer, to pay compensation in death cases where there are no dependents, as in tbe present case, is hardly in a position to complain.” McPherson v. Motor Sales Corp., 201 N. C., 303 (309); Columbia Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 200 Wis., 8, 227 N. W., 292; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Wells, 35 Ga. App., 759, 134 S. E., 788; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 163 N. Y. Supp., 944; Strang v. Electric Co., 8 N. J. Mis. R., 873; 152 Atl., 242; Republic Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill., 169, 152 N. E., 479.
As to tbe second question: “Did bis injury by accident, arise out of and in tbe course of bis employment?” Tbe facts found by tbe bearing Commissioner and approved by the full Commission: “Tbe plaintiff on 29 October, 1931, while regularly employed by tbe defendant, Planters National Bank and Trust Company, sustained an injury by accident as a result of an automobile wreck which occurred while be was en route to attend a meeting of tbe cotton committee for tbe purpose of procuring financial information for tbe use of tbe bank. Tbe accident arose out of and in tbe course of tbe plaintiff’s employment.” Tbe case of Williams v. Mills, Inc., 203 N. C., 848, was a Per Curiam opinion: “Tbis is an appeal from a judgment of tbe Superior Court sustaining an award of tbe Industrial Commission in behalf of tbe plaintiff. Tbe intestate, D. C. Williams, in a collision of automobiles suffered injury which caused bis death. Tbe Industrial Commission found that bis injury arose out of and in tbe course of bis employment. Tbis finding is contested by tbe appellant. There is evidence tending to sustain tbe findings upon which tbe award was based. Tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court is affirmed.” *220We have examined the facts in this case — although not set forth in the opinion- — and find them similar to the present case.
We think the evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding of fact by the Industrial Commission and approved by the court below, that plaintiff on the trip when he sustained the injury “while he was en route to attend a meeting of the cotton committee for the purpose of procuring financial information for the use of the bank.” The judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.