Tbe testimony of tbe plaintiff and that of C. A. Woods, defendant’s southern territorial officer, is in direct conflict as to what plaintiff’s salary was to be for tbe year 1932. They both agree that it was to equal bis Scranton compensation for tbe balance of 1931. Therefore, plaintiff’s testimony with respect to bis compensation for tbe year 1932, was directly challenged by defendant’s witness, C. A. Woods. In this state of tbe record, it was permissible for plaintiff to offer in evidence tbe correspondence bad between himself and officers of tbe defendant company, with respect to tbe terms of tbe contract of employment, as corroborative of bis own testimony. Allred v. Kirkman, 160 N. C., 392, 76 S. E., 244; Burnett v. R. R., 120 N. C., 517, 26 S. E., 819.
Tbe case is not like Leach and co. v. Peirson, 275 U. S., 120, 72 L. Ed., 194, and others of similar import, cited and relied upon by defendant, where tbe plaintiff sought to offer in evidence, as proof of tbe facts set forth therein, an unanswered letter, written by himself to defendant and containing self-serving declarations, tbe Court saying in tbe cited case that tbe failure to answer such a letter was not tantamount to an admission on tbe part of tbe defendant of tbe truth of tbe matters and things therein asserted. See Annotation, 8 A. L. K., 1163.
Likewise, tbe cases of S. v. Melvin, 194 N. C., 394, 139 S. E., 762, S. v. Exum, 138 N. C., 599, 50 S. E., 283, and S. v. Parish, 79 N. C., 610, strongly relied upon by defendant, are not against, but, for tbe purpose offered, are in support of tbe admissibility of tbe evidence now in question.
While not offered for tbe purpose, it is suggested by plaintiff that this evidence was also competent to show diligence on bis part to secure *524other employment in diminution of loss. Distributing Corp. v. Seawell, ante, 359; Mills v. McRae, 187 N. C., 707, 122 S. E., 762; Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N. C., 274, 142 S. E., 12.
It is observed that the defendant was allowed to strengthen C. A. Woods’ testimony by offering in evidence exchange of letters had between himself and other officers of the defendant company relative to plaintiff’s status. The competency of this evidence, as corroborative of defendant’s witness, is not questioned, though it may have been res inter alios acta. Stanley v. Lbr. Co., 184 N. C., 302, 114 S. E., 385; Bryant v. Bryant, 178 N. C., 77, 100 S. E., 178. The only purpose in mentioning this circumstance is to point out that both sides resorted to and were granted the privilege of offering corroborative evidence. The principle stated in Shelton v. R. R., 193 N. C., 670, 139 S. E., 232, is not involved.
The authority of C. A. Woods to act for the defendant in transferring plaintiff to the Charlotte store, and in agreeing upon his compensation, while challenged on the record, was properly ruled in favor of such authority. Lumber Co. v. Elias, 199 N. C., 103, 154 S. E., 54; Strickland v. Kress, 183 N. C., 534, 112 S. E., 30.
The remaining exceptions are not of sufficient merit to warrant a new trial, or to call for elaboration. The verdict and judgment will be upheld.
No error.