Where a check has been issued by a debtor and delivered by him to his creditor, in payment of his debt, the check is ordinarily merely a conditional payment. If the check is duly presented for payment, within a reasonable time after the date of its issuance, and upon such presentment is paid by the drawee bank, the debt is paid, and the debtor is discharged; if the check is not paid upon such presentment, the debt is not paid, and the creditor may recover of his debtor on his original obligation. If, however, the check is held by the payee, and is not presented for payment within a reasonable time after the date of its issuance, and for that reason is not paid because of the subsequent insolvency of the drawee bank, the debt is nevertheless paid, and the creditor cannot recover of his debtor on his original obligation. In such case, the debtor is discharged, because of the negligence of the payee or holder of the check, resulting in his loss because of the insolvency of the drawee bank.
*343These principles are well settled as the law in this State, and elsewhere. Chevrolet Co. v. Ingle, 202 N. C., 158, 162 S. E., 219; Bank v. Barrow, 189 N. C., 303, 127 S. E., 3; 48 C. J., 53. They are applicable to the facts found by the judge in the instant case. The question of law, therefore, presented by this appeal is whether there was error in the judgment which is predicated upon the finding of fact and conclusion of law that the delay of the plaintiffs in presenting the check for payment was not unreasonable.
It is provided by statute that in determining what is a reasonable oí-an unreasonable time within which a check must be presented for payment, where the check was issued and delivered in payment of a debt, regard must be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business, if any, with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case. C. S., 2978, C. S., 3168. In Mfg. Co. v. Summers, 143 N. C., 102, 55 S. E., 522, it is said by Solee-, J., that the statute prescribes as definite a rule as can well be established, or as is desirable. In Brittain v. Johnson, 12 N. C., 293, Taylor, C. J., says: “Though it may be inconvenient to have several rules, applicable to different classes of persons, it is confessedly more so to have one applied to all, which is wholly unsuited to the habits, transactions, and experience of the greater number. It is impossible to lay down a rule in the abstract which is equally just in its bearing on all persons to be affected by it; it must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and must be determined by the jury, under the directions of the court.”
In view of all the facts found by the judge in the instant case, which are conclusive and not reviewable by this Court, we are of the opinion that there was no error in the judgment. It is
Affirmed.