It is well settled as the law in this State that where a husband owns an automobile, which he keeps and maintains for use by his wife for her pleasure, and the wife while driving the automobile, by her negligence causes injuries to a third person, such person may recover of the husband damages for his injuries. Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C., 213, 145 S. E., 169. In the opinion in that case, it is said that in contemplation of law the negligence of the wife is imputed to the husband. In such case, the liability of the husband to the injured person is predicated upon the principle of respondeat superior. The wife, as the driver of the automobile, is the representative of the husband, and although she is driving the automobile for her pleasure, is engaged in his business, while driving the automobile for the purposes of its ownership. The relationship between the husband and the wife, with respect to the automobile, is analogous to that of master and servant, or principal and agent, and not that of bailor and bailee. The liability of the husband to the third person who was injured by the negligence of the wife, arises out of his relationship to her, with respect to the automobile, which she was driving at the time of the injury. This relationship is said to be that of master and servant, or principal and agent. The so-called “family purpose doctrine,” which is recognized *329and applied in this State for tire protection of third persons, is founded upon this principle.
In the instant case, the wife while driving the automobile which was owned by her husband and kept by him for her use and for her pleasure, suffered personal injuries, which it is alleged were caused by the defective condition of the automobile. In the absence of allegations that the husband knew of such condition, and with such knowledge failed to warn his wife of the danger of using the automobile, and of further allegations that the wife did not know and could not by reasonable inspection have discovered such defects, no cause of action is alleged in the complaint. See Plasikowski v. Arbus, 92 Conn., 556, 103 Atl., 642, L. R. A., 1918E, 415. In that case it is held that an employer is under no duty to warn an employee of dangers which are obvious, or to instruct him with respect to matters which he may fairly be supposed to understand. This principle of law was applied in that case, where it was held that a chauffeur could not recover of his employer damages for personal injuries suffered by him as the result of the defective condition of the automobile which he was driving for his employer. In the instant ease, a fair interpretation of the allegations of the complaint justify an application of this principle. On the facts alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff had equal if not greater opportunities to discover the alleged defects in the automobile as the defendant. If the defects were not obvious and could not have been discovered by the plaintiff, upon a reasonable inspection of the automobile, before the accident, then it follows that they could not have been discovered by the defendant upon such inspection. There is no error in the judgment.