Was there sufficient evidence of fraud and deceit to be submitted to tbe jury?
“Tbe essential elements of actionable fraud or deceit are tbe representation, its falsity, scienter, deception, and injury. Tbe representation must be definite and specific; it must be materially false; it must be made with knowledge of its falsity or in culpable ignorance of its truth; it must be made with fraudulent intent; it must be reasonably relied on by tbe other party; and be must be deceived and caused to suffer loss.” Electric Co. v. Morrison, 194 N. C., 316, 139 S. E., 455; Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N. C., 685, 143 S. E., 525.
Tbe evidence offered by tbe plaintiff tended to show that tbe agent of defendant pointed out a certain boundary of land, and that in preparing tbe deed only a portion of such lot pointed out was included therein. Tbe plaintiff testified that be relied upon tbe representations so made by tbe defendant. Nevertheless a deed was tendered covering a portion of Walnut and Broad streets and not including tbe area west of tbe land described in tbe deed, which tbe plaintiff contended was pointed out to him. Tbe plaintiff took tbe deed and turned it over to an attorney in whom be bad confidence in order that a full investigation of tbe title could be made before tbe consummation of tbe transaction. Presumably, after a full investigation, tbe attorney approved tbe title, and tbe deal was closed. There is no evidence that tbe defendant resorted to any trick, scheme or artifice tending to prevent full and complete examination of tbe description of tbe property contained in tbe deed as *512well as tbe title to the same. Such facts classify this case in the line of cases illustrated by the following: Gatlin v. Harrell, 108 N. C., 485, 13 S. E., 190; Griffin v. Lumber Co., 140 N. C., 514, 53 S. E., 307; Clements v. Ins. Co., 155 N. C., 57, 70 S. E., 1076; Terault v. Seip, 158 N. C., 363, 74 S. E., 3; Pittman v. Tobacco Growers Asso., 187 N. C., 340, 121 S. E., 634; Grace v. Strickland, 188 N. C., 369, 124 S. E., 856; Colt Co. v. Kimball, 190 N. C., 169, 129 S. E., 406; Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N. C., 685, 143 S. E., 525. The prevailing principle declared in the aforesaid line of cases was expressed in Griffin v. Lumber Co., supra, as follows: “It is elementary learning that common prudence requires that before signing a deed the grantor should read it, or, if unable to do so, should require it to be read to him, and his failure to do so, in the absence of any fraud or false representations as to its contents, is negligence, for the result of which the law affords no redress. . . . But when fraud or any device is resorted to by the grantee which prevents the reading, or having read, the deed, the rule is different.” In like vein Varser, J., wrote in Colt v. Kimball, supra, the following: “Defendant’s testimony shows that he is a man of education and prominence, accustomed to the transaction of business, and of much experience, with more than an average education; who has served on the board of education for Vance County for many years. It was his duty, unless fraudulently prevented therefrom, to read the contract, or, in case he was not able to read the fine print without stronger glasses, to have it read to him. This rule does not tend to impeach that valuable principle which commands us to treat each other as of good character, but rather enforces along with it, the salutary principle that each one must 'mind his own business’ and exercise due diligence to know what he is doing. Having executed the contract, and no fraud appearing in the procurement of the execution, the Court is without power to relieve the defendant on the ground that he thought it contained provisions which it does not.”
Furthermore, in Terault v. Seip, supra, the Court said: “An essential element of actionable fraud is the scienter or knowledge of the wrong on the part of the vendor. Where the representation is made as a part of the warranty, the vendor is held liable for his statement, whether he knew it to be true or not, but where the action is for fraud the burden is upon the party setting it up to prove the scienter.”
There is no evidence in the record tending to show that the agent of defendant knew that a part of the original lot had been conveyed to the city, nor does it appear that he knew the exact boundaries of the land owned by the defendant. While it is true that the deed accepted by the plaintiff covered land belonging‘to the city, the jury found that such portion was incorporated through the mutual mistake of the parties. *513Such finding of course eliminates tbe right to recover upon the breach of the covenant of seisin.
The Court is therefore of the opinion, and so holds that the motion for nonsuit, duly made upon the cause of action sounding in fraud and deceit, should have been granted.