The defendant, Nealie Brown, together with Hubert Lanier and Adolph Edwards, before his Honor, Judge E. H. Cranmer and a jury, at July Term, 1932, Duplin Superior Court, were jointly tried upon a bill of indictment charging them with the murder of Ambrose Lanier. Each of the three defendants were convicted of the crime of manslaughter and from the judgment of the court, Nealie Brown alone appeals.
At the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence the defendant Nealie Brown made motions to dismiss the action or for judgment of nonsuit. C. S., 4643. The court below overruled these motions and in this we see no error.
*399"We bave set forth some of tbe evidence on tbe part of tbe State. It was direct and circumstantial, sufficient to bave been submitted to tbe jury, as to all tbe defendants, tbe probative force was for them. Tbe evidence was to tbe effect tbat tbe defendants entered into a conspiracy to kill Ambrose Lanier and pursuant to said purpose were present, aiding and abetting in tbe crime.
Tbe manner and time in which the evidence is introduced to prove a conspiracy is in the sound discretion of the court below.
In S. v. Boswell, 194 N. C., at p. 264-5, citing numerous authorities, it is held: “It is thoroughly established law in this State that the declaration of one conspirator continues, even though made in the absence of the other conspirator. Usually the conspiracy must first be established before such evidence is competent, ‘but this, rule is often parted from, though it is an inversion of the order, for the sake of convenience, and the prosecution allowed either to prove the conspiracy, which makes the acts of the conspirators admissible in evidence against each other when done in furtherance of the common object, or he may prove the acts of different persons, and thus prove the conspiracy.” N. C. Handbook of Evidence, 2d ed. (Lockhart), p. 185, sec. 152.
The testimony of Norman Edwards was restricted by the court below as against the party defendant with whom the alleged conversation took place. We think none of these exceptions, to which assignments of error were made by defendants, can be sustained, they were limited in their scope. The answer “I know that they were mad,” was competent. In Moore v. Ins. Co., 192 N. C., at p. 582, we find: “A witness may say that a man appeared intoxicated, or angry or pleased. Bane v. R. R., 171 N. C., 328; S. v. Leah, 156 N. C., 643; McKelvey on Evidence, p. 220 et seq. Manifestly upon this principle, a witness may say that a man appeared sane and sober.”
The defendant went to the stand and denied the material evidence introduced by the State. The conflict of evidence was a fact for the jury to determine. We think none of the exceptions and assignments of error made on the trial as to the admission or exclusion of evidence can be sustained. We do not think the exclusion of evidence as to defendant’s kinship to deceased, nor his financial condition to support suicide theory on the whole record, prejudicial.
We find in the record no specific exceptions and assignments of error to the charge. Tbe record discloses tbe following exception and assignment of error, which cannot be sustained: “To the charge of the court in its entirety, the defendant in apt time objected on the grounds that the judge in his charge did not declare and explain the law arising* upon the evidence given in the case, and did not state in a plain and correct manner the evidence in the case.”
*400In Rawls v. Lupton, 193 N. C., at p. 430, citing a wealth.of authorities, we said: “Errors must he specifically assigned. An ‘unpointed, broadside’ exception to the ‘charge as given/ will not be considered. McKinnon v. Morrison, 104 N. C., 354. Exception to the charge of the court in general terms, not sufficiently specific to call the attention of the court to the particular point claimed to be erroneous, cannot be considered by an appellate court.”
We do not think the charge impinged on C. S., 564. The exception and assignment of error as to “alibi” cannot be sustained. This matter is fully discussed in S. v. Casey, 201 N. C., at p. 209.
As to the verdict of the jury on the trial, the record discloses: “The jury returned to the court room and when asked by the clerk, if they had arrived at a verdict, one juror answered, we find them all guilty of manslaughter, another answered guilty of third degree murder. Attorney for defendants asked that jury be polled, each juror asked as to each of the defendants, R. J. Alphin being the first juror polled answered third degree murder. Attorney for the defendant requested that the record speak what they say. The juror, Mr. Alphin, said he intended to say manslaughter. All the jurors then polled as to each defendant and all answered guilty of manslaughter. To the foregoing verdict, the defendants in apt time, objected and excepted.”
In the order correcting the minutes, it appears that there were no minutes to be corrected. “The court further finds as a fact, that the record heretofore sent to the Supreme Court by the clerk of this court, spoke the truth as the records then existed.”
The record discloses that on the trial of defendant the jury as polled answered “guilty of manslaughter.” We see no prejudicial or reversible error. The juror no doubt was thinking of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and manslaughter was third degree. The juror said he intended to say manslaughter. The court below had, under the facts and circumstances of this case, discretion to do what was done to make the record speak the truth and have it so recorded. The cases cited by the defendant are not applicable to the facts of record.
The learned and painstaking judge in the court below, in a long charge, gave all the contentions on both sides fairly, set forth the law carefully, applicable to the facts. We find no prejudicial or reversible error.
No error.