In Parker v. Dickinson, 196 N. C., 242, 145 S. E., 231, it is said: “Until a judicial sale has been confirmed, the purchaser is a mere preferred proposer. Confirmation is an act of consent and approval which the court gives to tbe sale, and for all practical purposes, tbe court is the vendor in such cases, and within the limitations prescribed by law, may give or withhold its consent in its discretion. Harrell v. Blythe, 140 N. C., 415, 53 S. E., 232.”
In the instant case, the clerk bad no power to confirm the sale reported by the commissioner until the expiration of twenty days from the date on which the report was filed. C. S., 763. If within ten days from the date of the sale, the bid bad been increased five per cent, and this amount paid to the clerk, it would have been the duty of the clerk to order a resale. Tbe clerk would have bad no discretion, in that case, as to whether be should make the order. C. S., 2591. But notwithstanding ten days bad elapsed from the date of the sale, at the time the increased bid was made, the clerk bad the power, in bis discretion, to *669order a resale, without waiting for the expiration of twenty days within which parties to the proceeding might file exceptions to the sale. During this time E. C. Guy, the purchaser at the sale was not a party to the proceeding, and therefore had no right to appear and object to the order of resale. He had no right to appear and move in the proceeding until the expiration of twenty days. Upchurch v. Upchurch, 173 N. C., 88, 91 S. E., 702. His appeal from the order of the clerk should have been dismissed.
There is error in the judgment reversing the order of the clerk, and directing the commissioner to execute a deed to the purchaser at the sale reported by the commissioner on 21 December, 1931. The judgment is
Eeversed.