The material elements of negligence alleged as constituting a cause of action are: (1) that the composing room was poorly lighted, and (2) that a slug truck was permitted to remain in an open space before rows of machines, which open space or walkway was used by employees in going from one part of the room to another in the performance of their duties.
The testimony of plaintiff clearly discloses that the slug truck was a customary and essential appliance or piece of equipment. It was designed for the purpose of being moved from place to place in the room as the progress of the work required. No defect appeared in its construction, and the plaintiff, an experienced printer, knew that when “men killed a linotype” they “place the slugs in a box on wheels for the purpose of rolling it back to the melting pot to be melted over again. It stayed there until enough was placed there before it was rolled back.” Consequently the location of this piece of movable equipment shifted to accommodate the changing conditions of the work. The principle of law applicable to such changing conditions of work was declared and applied in Brown v. Schofields Sons Company, 174 N. C., 4, 93 S. E., 381. The Court said: “The place where plaintiff was standing when hurt was not a place within the legal signification of that term. It was a condition liable to change at any moment whenever the prosecution of the work required plaintiff to change his position. The defendant's foreman could not possibly be aware of such changing conditions unless he was personally present all the time and exercising that vigilance for plaintiff which the law required him to exercise for himself.” Further quoting from a former decision, the Court said: “This Court has often held that an employer’s duty to provide for his employees a reasonably safe place to work does not extend to ordinary conditions arising during *482the progress of the work when the employee doing his work in his own way can see the dangers and avoid them by the exercise of reasonable care.”
The principle of liability involved in the case at bar is similar to that announced in Miller v. Globe Mfg. Co., 202 N. C., 254. In that case a workman in the cabinet room of defendant stepped on a “dowel pin” lying on the floor, causing him to fall and break his leg. The plaintiff said: “The reason that I stepped on it was not because the dowel pin was so small I could not see it, I was not looking.” The Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, said: “Plaintiff’s injury seems to have resulted from one of those unfortunate accidents which was not anticipated and could not have been foreseen in the exercise of reasonable prevision on the part of the defendant.” See, also, Owenby v. Power Co., 194 N. C., 129, 138 S. E., 529; Weatherman v. Tobacco Co., 198 N. C., 603, 152 S. E., 796; Goddard v. Southern Desk Co., 199 N. C., 22, 150 S. E., 608.
Cases involving injuries to^ third parties or customers in stores have no application to the present controversy.
The plaintiff was an experienced employee and thoroughly familiar with the methods of work pursued in the composing room. The slug-truck was a part of the movable equipment necessary for the proper performance of the work. The plaintiff neither alleged nor testified that the particular space in which the slug truck was parked, was the only walkway or alley way open to his use in performing the duty required by the employer. If a chair or a tool or dowel pin had been left in the walkway in all probability the same result would have been produced.
The plaintiff, hoAvever, asserts that the room “was poorly lighted,” the injury occurred at 4:30 in the afternoon, and plaintiff said, “After I fell over it I saw it. I did not see it before. I saw it after I struck it. Naturally, I saw it when I looked at it; of course, I was not blind.” There is no evidence that there was any change in the light before he fell and afterwards. Manifestly plaintiff, as the evidence discloses, was in a hurry, doubtless attempting to serve his employer the best he could, but the truck was there and the plaintiff could have seen it. It was said by this Court in Scott v. Telegraph Co., 198 N. C., 795, 153 S. E., 413: “The law does not impose on the employer any duty to take better care of his employee than the latter should take of himself.”
The Court is of the opinion that the motion for nonsuit should have been allowed.
Reversed.