The first contention of the defendants on their appeal to this Court is that no action to recover damages for malicious prosecution can be maintained where it is alleged in the complaint, and contended at the trial, that the damages resulted from the institution by the defendants of an involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy against the plaintiffs, by a petition filed in a United States District Court, as provided by the act of Congress, although it is alleged in the complaint and shown at the trial that such proceeding was instituted with malice, and without probable cause, and had been terminated before the commencement of the action by the dismissal of the petition. This contention is presented by defendants’ assignment of error based upon their exception to the refusal of the court to allow their motion for judgment as of nonsuit. Defendants did not demur to the complaint, for the obvious reason that it is alleged therein, not only that the defendants filed the petition praying that the plaintiffs be adjudged bankrupts, but also that at the time of filing the petition, the defendants procured the appointment by the court of a receiver, who, as authorized and directed by the court, at once took charge of and held the property of the plaintiffs for about twenty-one days, during which time the plaintiffs suffered damages in a large sum, by reason of the seizure and detention of their property. In support of their contention, the defendants rely upon the principle that no action for the malicious prosecution of a civil action by the defendants against the plaintiffs, can be maintained, as was held by this Court in Terry v. Davis, 114 N. C., 31, 98 S. E., 943. This principle, however, as stated in the opinion in that case, is subject to certain exceptions. It is there said that an action will not lie for the malicious prosecution of a civil action, unless there was an arrest of the person, or a seizure of property, as in attachment proceedings at law, or their equivalent in equity, or in proceedings in bankruptcy or like cases when there was some special damage resulting from an action and *456which would not necessarily result in all cases of the like kind. In Shute v. Shute, 180 N. C., 386, 104 S. E., 764, it is said by Clark, C. J., “That actions for malicious prosecution will lie when there has been interference with person or property in civil proceedings where the circumstances justify a charge of malicious prosecution, is tacitly recognized in many cases. Estates v. Bank, 171 N. C., 579, 88 S. E., 783, Wright v. Harris, 160 N. C., 542, 76 S. E., 489, Carpenter v. Hanes, 167 N. C., 555, 83 S. E., 577.”
An involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy, instituted by a petition duly filed in a United States District Court, as provided by the act of Congress, by creditors, praying that their debtor be adjudged a bankrupt, is not a mere civil action against the debtor for the collection of the debt due by him to the petitioning creditors; the primary purpose of the proceeding, for the relief of such creditors/is to impound the! property of the debtor in the custody of the court, in order that it \ may be equitably distributed among all the creditors, upon the adjudica- \ tion of the debtor as a bankrupt. 7 C. J., 46. The fact that the debtor, / after his adjudication as a bankrupt may file a petition and be discharged by the court from personal liability for his debts, does not affect the principle that the proceeding is not a civil action. In the instant case, it is alleged and shown by the evidence not only that defendants filed the petition, but also that they procured the seizure and detention of the property of the plaintiffs by a receiver, with malice and without probable cause. The contention that plaintiff cannot maintain this action, and that it was therefore error to refuse the motion for judgment as of nonsuit, cannot be sustained.
We have considered the assignments of error on this appeal based upon defendants’ exceptions to rulings of the court on defendants’ objections to evidence offered by the plaintiffs at the trial. These assignments of error cannot be sustained. The evidence tending to show that the defendant, Arthur Goodman, and a salesman of the defendant, Samuel Saffer, who had collected money from the plaintiffs on his account, had threatened to ruin the credit of the plaintiffs in Baltimore and New York, was competent and properly admitted for the purpose of showing malice on the part of the defendants in filing and prosecuting the petition in bankruptcy against the plaintiffs. The evidence tending to show the standing of the plaintiffs as business men and merchants in Wagram and in Smithfield, was competent and properly admitted for the purpose of showing the damages which they suffered by the wrongful acts of the defendants. The order of the United States District Court, dismissing the petition, and discharging the receiver, upon the findings of the special master that plaintiffs were solvent, and had committed *457no act of bankruptcy, which were approved by the judge, showed that the proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy had terminated before the commencement of this action. Its retention by the court solely for the purpose of hearing plaintiffs’ motions for allowances for costs and expenses, and the assessment of damages, did not show the contrary. The plaintiffs had the right, at their election, to have their damages caused by the wrongful acts of the defendants assessed in this- action, rather than in the bankruptcy proceeding. Shute v. Shute, supra. The defendants, who failed to comply with the order, of the United States District Court that they file a bond in said court in a sum adequate for the protection of the plaintiffs, cannot complain that plaintiffs, instead of moving in said court for an assessment of their damages, brought this action.
The court instructed the jury with respect to want of probable cause in accordance with the law uniformly applied in the courts of this State and elsewhere. There was no error in the charge of the court to the jury. The judgment is affirmed.
No error.