Tbe questions involved.: Did tbe court bave jurisdiction of tbe action and of tbe parties and subject-matter of tbe action? Did tbe court bave jurisdiction and power to ratify and confirm tbe contract entered into by tbe petitioners, and to render tbe judgment appealed from? Does said judgment bind unborn contingent remaindermen and all persons having a vested or contingent interest, or having a possibility of interest under tbe will or in tbe estate of J. Leak Spencer, deceased ? All tbe questions above set forth involved in this appeal must be answered in tbe affirmative.
In Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence (1929), Yol. 1, part sec. 495; p. 569-70-71, tbe law is stated as follows: “A trustee finding himself embarrassed by uncertainty as to bis duties or rights may under proper conditions apply to a court of equity for instructions and advice. Nothing is more common, and nothing is better settled, than tbe right, and in a proper case, tbe duty of a trustee to invoke tbe direction and aid of a court of equity in tbe execution of tbe trust. Tbe power is exercised with great caution, as it may involve passing upon substantial rights of persons not within tbe jurisdiction. Tbe question upon which advice is sought must be one of present, or at least imminent urgency. Tbe relief is usually upon principles of quia timet, or interpleader, and involves a showing of conflicting claims or tbe probability thereof without any other satisfactory means of determining them in such manner as to protect tbe trustee. 'Moot’ questions are not proper for submission. Trustees should not therefore be advised as to tbe management of funds which bave not come into their bands, nor as to tbe proper method of exercising a discretion invested solely in them, nor in cases where tbe advice may be of no use, as where tbe instrument whose construction is sought is being contested for alleged invalidity, nor where tbe trust has terminated, nor to settle conflicting rights of beneficiaries on tbe termination of tbe trust. Tbe trustee must be honestly in doubt as to bis course of action.”
Tbe author, supra, cites as an authority Bank v. Alexander, 188 N. C., 667. In that case it is held, at p. 667 (beadnote) : “Our courts, in tbe exercise of their equitable power, bave supervisory jurisdiction in tbe administration of trust estates, and tbe trustee, in cases of doubt arising in tbe course of bis administration of tbe trusts imposed by tbe instrument, may resort to them for instruction. "Where a will provides for *670an income, to the widow, and, among other things, for contingent interests to ulterior takers, minors, some of whom are not in esse appointing a trustee with power to carry out the provisions of the will, and all those who are to take upon contingency are not only represented by the trustee, but by class representation, and a guardian has been appointed and is acting for all minor interests, both in esse and otherwise: Held, the courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the question as to whether a contract made between the widow and another principal beneficiary, making her an increased allowance in consideration that she will not dissent from the will, will be in the best interest of all parties; and its action confirming the contract and preserving the corpus of the estate for the administration of the trust imposed will not be disturbed on appeal.” Ernul v. Ernul, 191 N. C., 347; Bank v. Edwards, 193 N. C., 118; Waddell v. Cigar Stores, 195 N. C., 434; Trust Co. v. Stevenson, 196 N. C., 29; Mountain Park Institute v. Lovill, 198 N. C., 642; Finley v. Finley, 201 N. C., 1.
In Williams v. Williams, 68 N. E., 449, 204 Ill., 44, that Court said, at pp. 50-51: “The first question relates to the power of a court of chancery to authorize the settlement of a suit brought by a minor to set aside a will upon terms which, in the opinion of the court, are advantageous to the minor. . . . It is well settled that courts of chancery exercise a superintendence over infants and their property as a branch of their general jurisdiction. The protection of the rights of infants is one of the duties of courts of equity and those courts from the earliest period have been vested with a broad and comprehensive jurisdiction over the persons and property of infants. . . . (At p. 52.) It would seem to be reasonable that, upon a bill filed by an infant to contest a will, a court of chancery should have the power to compromise and settle the issues, and by its decree sustain the will, and establish peace between the parties. It cannot be that such a litigation must continue, probably to the disruption of the family, and perhaps to the bankruptcy of the estate, because some of the parties are not sui juris.” Johns et al. v. Montgomery, 106 N. E., 497, 265 Ill., 21. Bennett’s Guardian v. Cary’s Executor, 276 S. W., 818 (1925), 210 Ky., 725.
In Springs v. Scott, 132 N. C., at p. 564, it is held: “With regard to the act of' 1903 (see N. 0. Code, Anno., Michie, sec. 1744, and cases cited), the court has the power to order the sale of real estate limited to a tenant for life with remainder to children or issue, upon failure thereof, over to persons, all or some of whom are not in esse, when one of the class being first in remainder after the expiration .of the life estate in esse and a party to the proceeding to represent the class, and that upon decree passed, and sale and title made pursuant thereto, -the *671purchaser acquires a perfect title as against all persons in esse or m posse.” Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N. C., 257.
In Waddell v. Cigar Stores, supra, at p. 438, we find: “In Ex Parte Dodd, 62 N. C., 98, this Court held that if land be devised to a person for life with remainder in fee to his children a sale of the land cannot be ordered before the birth of a child, because there is no one in esse to represent its interest; but if there be a living child in whom the fee can vest a sale may be ordered, though all the children of their class may not yet have been born. See Miller ex parte, 90 N. C., 625; Irvin v. Clark, 98 N. C., 437; Springs v. Scott, 132 N. C., 548; Lumber Co. v. Herrington, 183 N. C., 85; Bank v. Alexander, 188 N. C., 667. But the rule formerly prevailing has been modified by legislation. C. S., 1744. Pendleton v. Williams, 175 N. C., 248; Poole v. Thompson, 183 N. C., 588.” C. S., 1744. Eemainders to uncertain persons; procedure for sale; proceeds secured. C. S., 1745. Sales of contingent remainders validated.
Without analyzing the facts in this controversy and the judgment of the court below, we think it was the proper one under the facts and circumstances of this case. We think those in esse or in posse, are properly represented in this proceeding; all parties who could possibly have any interest in the estate are parties to this action and the infant and all unborn children who might have any interest, are properly represented. From a careful examination of the facts, as found by the court below and the judgment rendered, we think a court of equity has jurisdiction in the matter. We think the judgment fair to all and not prejudicial to the parties who have either vested or contingent interests.
The policy of the law is to encourage settlement of family disputes like the present, so as to promote peace, good will and harmony among those connected by consanguinity or affinity. Equity favors amicable adjustments. In the present action, the contract that was made was a compromise over the provisions of the will, based on the present deflation in prices and an adjustment of other differences. The court below found the facts at length with care, and rendered judgment that it was to the best interest of all that “the terms and provisions of said contract ... be accepted, ratified and approved and carried into effect.” It was further found as a fact “that the parties to this proceeding are all properly before the court,” etc.
Speaking to the subject, in Carstarphen v. Carstarphen, 193 N. C., 548, is the following: “A sound public policy looks to the speedy ending of litigation. Courts never encourage litigation, but look with favor on adjustment of differences, and this is especially true in family disputes.” For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.