The Corporation Commission is a statutory court of record with all the powers of a court of general jurisdiction as to all subjects embraced in the chapter under which it is constituted. It consists of three commissioners elected by the qualified voters of the State. Its regular sessions are held in the city of Ealeigh and it is open at all times for the transaction of business. It has general control of specified corporations; it constitutes the board of State tax commissioners; and at the time set out in the indictment it had the supervision of such banking institutions as were subject to the laws of the State, with authority to make rules for the government of such institutions and to appoint a bank examiner to investigate their affairs. The business of the commission is transacted at the capital of the State, excepting such business as may be done in special sessions elsewhere held “when in the judgment of the commission the convenience of all parties is best sub-served and expense is thereby saved.” North Carolina Code, 1931, sec. 1023 et seq.; C. S., 249 et seq. At the hearing in Buncombe County the court adjudged that the acts for which the defendants were indicted related to their official duties, and found as a fact that these acts were done in Wake County and not in Buncombe. It was to this situation that the plea in abatement was primarily addressed. The plea raises the question whether a grand jury in Buncombe County had jurisdiction or power to indict the defendants for alleged misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in the county of Wake.
The Declaration of Eights, sec. 12, declares, “No person shall be put to answer any criminal charge . . . but by indictment, presentment or impeachment”; and the word “indictment” has been construed to *444mean indictment by a grand jury as defined by the common law. S. v. Barker, 107 N. C., 913. "What, then, was the territorial jurisdiction of a grand jury under the law of England ?
With respect to the question presented the common-law doctrine was clearly defined. “The grand jury,” said Blackstone, “are sworn to inquire only for the body of the county, pro corpora comitatusj and therefore they cannot regularly inquire of a fact done out of that county for which they are sworn, unless particularly enabled by an act of parliament.” 4 Com., 303. No less direct is Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown: “But of whatsoever nature an offense indicted may be, whether local or transitory, as seditions, words, or battery, etc., it seems to be agreed, that if upon not guilty pleaded it shall appear, that it was committed in a county different from that in which the indictment was found, the defendant shall be acquitted.” Ch. 25, sec. 51. “At common law, the venue should always be laid in the county where the offense is committed, although the charge is in its nature transitory, as seditions, words, or battery; and it does not lie on the prisoner to disprove the commission of the offense in the county in which it is laid, but it is an essential ingredient in the evidence on the part of the prosecutor, to prove that it was committed within it.” 1 Chitty on Criminal Law, 177. The substance of this summary has been referred to in a number of our decisions. S. v. Lytle, 117 N. C., 799; S. v. Carter, 126 N. C., 1011; S. v. Oliver, 186 N. C., 329.
The orderly sequence of these propositions is the question whether this principle of the common law prevails in the courts of this State. Before the adoption of our Constitution it was declared that all such parts of the common law as were theretofore in use within the State and were not destructive of, repugnant to, or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of the State and its form of government and not otherwise provided for, abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, were in full force within the State. This statute is now in effect. C. S., 970. It is generally conceded that so much of the common law as is in force by virtue of this provision is subject to legislative control and may therefore be modified or repealed. But there are parts of the common law which are not subject to modification or repeal by the Legislature because they are inbedded in the Constitution.
The exercise of such control as it affects an indictment found by the grand jury of a county in which the offense was not committed is exemplified in the North Carolina Criminal Code of 1931, sections 4600 and 4606(b). The former confers upon the Superior Court of any county which adjoins the county in which the crime of lynching shall be committed jurisdiction over the crime and over the offender to the same *445extent as if tbe crime bad been committed in tbe bounds of tbe adjoining county. Tbis statute, enacted in 1893, was declared constitutional in S. v. Lewis, 142 N. C., 626. Tbe latter section provides tbat wben a judge of tbe Superior Court shall remove an indictment from one county to another under section 4606(a), if tbe indictment is defective tbe grand jury of tbe county to which tbe removal is made shall have jurisdiction to find another bill for tbe same offense. These are tbe only statutes which in express terms give tbe grand..jury jurisdiction to find a bill outside tbe county in which tbe offense was committed.
There is another statute which provides tbat in tbe prosecution of all offenses it shall be taken as true tbat tbe offense was committed in tbe county in which by tbe indictment it is alleged to have taken place unless tbe defendant shall make denial by a plea in abatement setting forth tbe proper county. If upon issue joined tbe matter is found for tbe defendant be must be held to answer tbe offense in tbe county which be avers is tbe proper venue. Tbe statute suggests its necessity “because tbe boundaries of many counties are either undetermined or unknown, by reason whereof high offenses go unpunished.” In S. v. Mitchell, 83 N. C., 674, it is said in reference to tbis act: “Tbe mischief intended to be remedied by it was tbe difficulty encountered by tbe courts in effecting tbe conviction of persons who bad violated tbe criminal law of tbe State where tbe offense was committed near tbe boundaries of counties which were undetermined or unknown. And it often happened tbat, where tbe boundaries were established and known, it was uncertain from tbe proof whether tbe offense was committed on tbe one or tbe other side of tbe line, and, in consequence of tbe uncertainty and tbe doubt arising from it, offenders went hinwhipt of justice.’ Tbis was tbe evil intended to be remedied. It bad reference to tbe violation of tbe laws of tbis State committed near tbe boundaries of counties.”
When there is substantial ground to doubt whether a statute was meant to apply to particular facts tbe intention of tbe Legislature may generally be determined from a consideration of tbe purpose for which . tbe act was passed. Black on Interpretation of Laws, sec. 33. It is held, also, tbat as a rule statutes are to be construed with reference to tbe common law in existence at .the time of their enactment. Kearney v. Vann, 154 N. C., 311.
Section 4606 was evidently intended to provide relief in difficulties originating in doubt entertained in good faith as to tbe county in which tbe offense was committed, and should not be construed to modify tbe common law beyond tbe reasonable scope of its manifest purpose.
Tbe facts pleaded in abatement challenged tbe jurisdiction of tbe Superior Court of Buncombe County for tbe reason tbat tbe grand jury *446there was without jurisdiction to indict the defendants for a breach of the criminal law averred to have been committed in the county of Wake. At common law the grand jury of the county in which the bill was found had no jurisdiction of the indictment, and we have no statute enacted by the General Assembly except as heretofore noted, “no act of parliament,” conferring such jurisdiction. Whether such a statute, if enacted, would be sustained as an exercise of legislative power or declared invalid because in conflict with the organic law is a matter outside the scope of this discussion.
There was no error in sustaining the plea in abatement. The effect of the judgment is to terminate any further action or prosecution on the indictment found in Buncombe County and to discharge the defendants. S. v. Carter, supra; S. v. Oliver, supra.
It is not necessary to consider the demurrer. The judgment sustaining the plea, declaring the indictment void, and discharging the defendants is
Affirmed.