The defendant, Ealeigh Granite Company, in the court below, at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, and at the conclusion of all the evidence, made motions for judgment as in case of nonsuit. C. S., 567. These motions were overruled and in this we can see no error.
We think the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff, sufficient in this case to have been submitted to the jury. We only consider the evidence of plaintiff. It was a question for the jury and not for us; nor do we find any error in the trial of the action in the court below.
All the evidence was to the effect that the Ealeigh Granite Company had control of the plaintiff “to indicate the work which the plaintiff was to do,” and did so indicate the work at the place where the plaintiff was injured. At the time plaintiff was not actually under the control of the State Prison authorities. Jenkins v. Griffith, 189 N. C., 633; Reeves v. Construction Co., 194 N. C., 817. Under the facts and circumstances of this case the Ealeigh Granite Company owed plaintiff a duty that is well settled in this jurisdiction.
In Beck v. Tanning Co., 179 N. C., at p. 125, we find: “It is unquestionably the duty of the master to use proper care in providing a reasonably safe place where the servant may do his work, and reasonably safe machinery, implements, and so forth, with which to do the work assigned to him (West v. Tanning Co., 154 N. C., 44), and this duty is a primary, and an absolute one, which he cannot delegate to another Avithout, at the same time, incurring the risk of himself becoming liable for the neglect of his agent, so entrusted with the performance of this duty which belongs to the master, for in such a case, the negligence of the agent, or fellow-servant, if he is appointed to act for the master, is the latter’s neglect also-,” citing numerous authorities. Beck v. Chair Co., 188 N. C., 743; Parker v. Mfg. Co., 189 N. C., 275; Thomas v. Lawrence, 189 N. C., 521. Liability frequently attaches when injury is caused by negligence of alter ego, to aggrieved party. Howard v. Oil Co., 174 N. C., at p. 653.
Speaking to the subject, we find in 21 E. C. L. “Prisons and Prisoners,” part sec. 26, p. 1089-90, the following: “While, in a sense, the relation of master and servant may be said to exist between a prisoner and the lessee of his labor, and some authorities so hold, the relation cannot be said to exist in the strict sense, because the service is not voluntary, or for hire or reward, and also because the control exercised by the con*310tractor over the convict is usually limited. Consequently it has been held that where the State, by officers of its own selection, retains the immediate and direct supervision and control of leased convicts, the hirer thereof is not liable to the prisoner for injuries due to negligent acts which he has no power to prevent. He is, however, held to a master’s liability to the convict in respect to those incidents of the employment over which he has the same measure of control that a master ordinarily has. Therefore, it is held that he is not relieved of the ordinary, care towards convicts which he is required to exercise towards his employees, and he will be 1'iable to them for failure to provide a safe place in which to work and for knowingly bringing vicious persons into contact with them. The contractor is also bound to see that the appliances with which the prisoner is working are reasonably safe. . . . But where the prisoner of his own volition chooses an unusually dangerous method of executing the contractor’s commands, .he may be barred by contributory negligence.-” See Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C., 185.
Under the facts and circumstances of- this case, we do- not think that the engineer of the hoisting engine was a fellow-servant of plaintiff, therefore the prayer for instruction by the Raleigh Granite Company to that effect cannot be sustained. Thompson v. Oil Co., 177 N. C., at p. 282; Robinson v. Ivey, 193 N. C., at p. 812; Pyatt v. R. R., 199 N. C., at p. 404.
The exceptions and assignments of error as to the testimony of plaintiff’s uncle cannot be sustained. A week after plaintiff’s injury, he saw the place and the wire cable and described its condition at that time. This was a circumstance — some evidence. Then again, this may not be prejudicial, the evidence was to the effect that the engineer of the hoisting engine, an alter ego, who according to plaintiff’s evidence he “hollered to the man to go forward and instead of going forward ho sent it back and that caught my hand and coat,” etc.
In Blevins v. Cotton Mills, 150 N. C., at p. 498, we find the following : “It may be well to note that the doctrine we are now discussing refers to the objective conditions, where, from the facts and circumstances, it is reasonably probable that no change has occurred, and must not be confused with the position which obtains with us, that voluntary changes made by an employer after an injury to an employee, and imputed to the employer’s negligence, are not, as a rule, relevant on the trial of an issue between them.” Almond, v. Oceola Mills, Inc., ante, at p. 100; 10 R. C. L. “Evidence,” sec. 112, p. 943. The evidence was undoubtedly competent to corroborate the plaintiff and no request was made that it be restricted. See latter part of Rule 21 of Practice in the Supreme Court,1 200 N. C., at p. 821 and cases cited.
*311We think the special instructions asked for by defendant properly refused by the court below. It will be noted that the court below submitted an issue of contributory negligence and charged the law on this aspect applicable to the facts. In the charge of the court below we find no error, taking the charge as a whole. The court below charged correctly what was negligence, and further “that such negligent breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury, the cause .that produced the result in continuous sequence, and without which it would not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen that such a result was probable under all the facts as they existed.”
The defendants’ contentions that in other parts of the charge proximate cause is not repeated, we cannot say, if error, it was prejudicial. In the judgment of the court below, we find
No error.