The court convened on the second day of March, 1931, and on the fifth the defendant moved for a continuance on the ground that he was not physically able to go to trial. He produced two certificates, each signed by a reputable physician, indicating the defendant’s “highly nervous state” and the probability of a nervous collapse or breakdown. The motion was denied and the case was set for trial on the following Monday. It was not called at that time, but the trial judge of his own motion requested a physician from Asheville to examine the defendant and to determine whether he could be brought to trial without detriment to his health and whether he would likely be more able to stand the trial in October. The physician found no organic disease, referred the defendant’s condition to large doses of hypnotic drugs, and expressed the opinion that under certain conditions he would soon “be able to undergo the court proceedings.” The case was finally called on the eleventh day of March, when the defendant’s motion for a continuance was again overruled. The,denial of the motion is the subject of the first three exceptions.
It is now a familiar axiom that granting or refusing the continuance of a cause is a matter which rests in the discretion of the trial court *103and in tbe absence of gross abuse is not subject to review on appeal. S. v. Sauls, 190 N. C., 810; S. v. Riley, 188 N. C., 72; Hensley v. Furniture Co., 164 N. C., 149; Armstrong v. Wright, 8 N. C., 93. Instead of abusing bis discretion, tbe presiding judge made a careful and patient investigation of tbe circumstances pending tbe -several motions of tbe defendant and refused a continuance after sufficient opportunity for reflection. These exceptions are overruled.
Tbe principal assault is made upon tbe admission in evidence of certain boobs, entries, and exhibits, and tbe testimony of witnesses in reference to their significance and to their bearing on tbe question of tbe defendant’s guilt. Tbe boobs, referred "to as exhibits, include tbe record of certificates of deposit issued, a transfer binder of tbe sheets mahing up tbe daily’ cash journal binder, a loose leaf ledger, and a certificate of deposit account. Tbe reason assigned for challenging tbe admissibility of these records is tbe absence of evidence tending to show tbe defendant’s admission that they were tbe boobs of tbe banb or that they were properly identified. That there is evidence of identity is not open to debate. Grubbs, tbe public accountant, who began bis examination of tbe bank’s affairs on tbe twenty-first of November, testified that these boobs were in tbe vault and together with tbe keys were turned over to him by J. Allen Ebodes, tbe cashier, and Cecil Ehodes, tbe bookkeeper. Kramer, tbe liquidating agent, said the Corporation Commission gave him tbe keys to tbe vault where be found tbe books about which be testified. Tbe defendant admitted that, be bad made a false entry on tbe certificate of deposit account to offset debit entries extending over a long period, and that be bad used the cash for bis personal benefit. Tbe sums thus applied amounted to about $20,000 and no doubt comprised tbe fund, or a part of tbe fund, charged in tbe first count of tbe indictment to have been embezzled. So far as tbe record reveals, although tbe defendant was not questioned as to all tbe exhibits, at no time did be suggest tbe nonidentity of those about which be was examined; and, as all tbe records were found in tbe vault, this also was a circumstance for tbe consideration of tbe jury.
It is contended, however, that tbe evidence does not show by whom tbe entries in tbe books were made or authorized, and that tbe testimony of tbe accountant and tbe liquidating agent in explanation of tbe entries should have been excluded. Tbe supporting argument proceeds on tbe theory that tbe records and books of a corporation may not be received in evidence for any purpose unless it is shown or admitted that the entries were made by an authorized servant or agent of tbe corporation. It is not doubted that cases apparently of such tenor may be cited, but tbe question of their application to given cases must be solved by refer*104ence to tbe matters in controversy — the object and scope of the litigation and the particular facts admitted or established.
The First Bank and Trust Company was created by statute; it was subject to public supervision; its rights, powers, and privileges were prescribed by law. It was presumed in the exercise of its powers to have appropriate books and to keep a correct record of its transactions. That it had such books is not denied. Proof of their identity as the property of the bank raised the additional presumption that the entries and records which they contain were made by an accredited clerk or agent of the corporation. Glenn v. Orr, 96 N. C., 413; Turnpike v. McCarson, 18 N. C., 306.
It was upon this principle that the exhibits were admitted in evidence. But they were not self-explanatory; negation as well as affirmation was a prominent feature of the prosecution.. If explanation of the entries was essential, so likewise of the omissions, which must be proved by oral testimony. To elucidate the controversy and to establish its theory the State examined T. R. Grubbs and II. G. Kramer as two of its witnesses. The defendant objected, but we think the competency of their testimony cannot reasonably be questioned.
They examined the books, made tabulations and calculations, and testified as to the results of their investigation. This mode of exemplifying the records of an insolvent bank has received the approval of this Court in S. v. Hightower, 187 N. C., 300. It is founded on considerations of policy and convenience, if not of necessity, and commendably results in relaxation of the rigid rule which would require the production of all the employees, who through an indefinite period had made entries in books of the corporation. Where a fact can be ascertained only by the inspection of a large number of documents made up of many detailed statements it would be practically out of the question to require the entire mass of documents and entries to be read by or in the presence of the jury. As such examination cannot conveniently be made in court the results may be shown by the person who made the examination. Wigmore on Evidence (2 ed.), sec. 1234; Chamberlayne on Evidence, sec. 2317. The production of the documents and the privilege of cross-examination and of the introduction of evidence afford ample protection of the defendant’s rights.
We find no error in the charge. Evidence as to the defendant’s good character, brought out on the cross-examination, was favorable to himself. The remaining exception is without merit.