The question of law involved appears from the following findings of fact and judgment entered by the trial judge:
“This cause came on for trial, and during the progress of the trial, and before more than one witness had completed her testimony it was suggested to the court by counsel present, that the propounder to the will was represented by counsel, to wit, Senator P. W. Glidewell, of Reidsville; that the court had previously inquired if the propounder was represented by counsel, and was informed by counsel for the caveator that he knew of no counsel representing the propounder.
That, during the progress of the trial, and when the court was informed that Mr. Glidewell represented the propounder, the court informed counsel for the caveator of this fact and told counsel for the caveator that the court would allow him to proceed, but that if it after-*755wards developed tbat tbe propounder was represented by counsel, tbat tbe court would probably set aside tbe verdict.
Tbe court finds as a fact tbat P. W. Glidewell is a practicing attorney of Reidsville, North Carolina, and is a regular practicing attorney in tbe county of Guilford, and tbat said Glidewell bad not received a copy of tbe calendar upon wbicb tbe case was calendared for trial, and tbat said Glidewell appeared witbin about two hours after tbe verdict of tbe jury and made a motion to set aside tbe verdict, stating tbat be was tbe regularly retained counsel for the propounder. Tbe court so found as a fact all of tbe above as stated, and set aside tbe verdict in tbe court’s discretion, and refused to sign tbe judgment tendered by counsel for the caveator.” •
From tbe foregoifig it appears tbat tbe judge set aside tbe verdict in bis discretion. In such cases it is not necessary to find tbe facts, and tbe judgment is affirmed upon authority of Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N. C., 488; Abernethy v. Yount, 138 N. C., 337; Likas v. Lackey, 186 N. C., 398.
Affirmed.