When the plaintiff in a civil action has introduced his evidence and rested his ease the defendant may move for dismissal of the action, or for judgment as in case of nonsuit. If the motion is allowed the plaintiff may .except and appeal; if it is not allowed the defendant may except, and if he introduces no evidence the jury shall pass upon the issues, and he may have the benefit of the latter exception on appeal. A motion for dismissal or for judgment of nonsuit made at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and not renewed at the close of all the evidence is waived. Earnhardt v. Clement, 137 N. C., 91; Teal v. Templeton, 149 N. C., 32; Wooley v Bruton, 184 N. C., 438; Nowell v. Basnight, 185 N. C., 142. Indeed, by introducing evidence a defendant waives the exception taken when the plaintiff rested his case. Smith v. Pritchard, 173 N. C., 720.
In this action the defendant not only introduced witnesses; she failed to renew her motion for nonsuit at the close of the evidence. We must, therefore, treat the appeal as if the defendant had made no motion to dismiss the action.
An objection that there is not sufficient evidence on an issue must ordinarily be made before verdict; it is too late after verdict first to question the sufficiency of the evidence. This is the uniform rule of practice. Fagg v. Loan Association, 113 N. C., 364; S. v. Kiger, 115 *342N. C., 746; Holden v. Strickland, 116 N. C., 185; Sutton v. Walters, 118 N. C., 495; S. v. Harris, 120 N. C., 577; Hart v. Cannon, 133 N. C., 10; Mincey v. Construction Co., 191 N. C., 548. This may be assigned as one of the reasons why the plaintiff may not take a voluntary nonsuit after a verdict has been returned against him. C. S., 604.
Cogent reason for adhering to this practice is found in the provisions of section 567 of the Consolidated Statutes, under which the defendant in an action is given ample opportunity before verdict to question the adequacy of the evidence, and to present for decision and by exception to reserve for review all relevant questions of law. We have held that where issues are answered in favor of the plaintiff in an action for personal injury, the trial court, having denied a motion for nonsuit duly made in accordance with the statute, may not defeat the plaintiff’s recovery by thereafter holding that there was no causal relation between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury (Morgan v. Owen, ante, 34) ; also that the trial court, after denying a motion for nonsuit and accepting a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, may not ordinarily set the verdict aside for want of evidence as a matter of law. Godfrey v. Coach Co., ante, 41.
In the present case the defendant waived her right to move before verdict that the action be dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence, and after the verdict was returned the judge was remitted to the exercise of his discretion on the.question of vacating the verdict. In S. v. Kiger, supra, it is said that if the presiding judge is of opinion that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or that the evidence was insufficient, he is vested with the power to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, and that the exercise of such power is a matter of discretion.
The cause is remanded to the end that such discretion be exercised and that further proceedings be had in accordance with this opinion.
Error and remanded.