EDENTON,
OCTOBER TERM, 1795.
The last line of a boundary was from a white oak, (which stood half a mile from the river) thence along the river to the beginning : held, that the river is the boundary.
Ejectment. The land in controversy was patented in ttyeyear 1706, by one Gee, and a transfer of two hundred *272acres of the tract was made to Briclgers by endorsement on the deed. In 1752, Bridgers conveyed to Robert San-difer, who in 1765, devised to his son Robert Sandifer, after the death of ttie devisor’s widow; but in the. mean time, he gave the lands to her for her life. She is yet alive, and bad) conveyed the lands to the Plaintiffs. In the year 1780, John Sandifer obtained a grant from the State, and conveyed to his son Robert, who conveyed to tiie Defendant apart of this land. Gee’s patent began at the mouth of Dividing run, thence north, thence cast, thence south to a white-oak, thence along the river to the beginning. This white-oak stood half a mile from the river ; and if the line be run a direct course from thence to the beginning, a large part of the land described in the Plaintiff’s grant, will be left out of Gee’s patent; but if the ilver is deemed to be the boundary, tin1 land described in the Defendant’s grant will then be included in Gee’s patent, and of course, be also included in Bridger’s deed.
Per curiam,
Williams and Haywood,
after argument — the river in this case, must be considered as the boundary of Gee’s patent — it has always been thus uniformly decided in our courts.
The jury found accordingly, and there was judgment, accordingly' — Baker for Plaintiff, Keys for Defendant.
Note. — Vide Hartsfield v. Westbrook, post 258—note to Bradford v. Hill, ante 22.