In Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C., 200, 124 S. E., 566, it is said: “When land is conveyed or devised to a husband and wife as such, they take the estate so conveyed or devised, as tenants by the entirety, and not as joint tenants or tenants in common. Harrison v. Ray, 108 N. C., 215. This tenancy by the entirety takes its origin from the common law when husband and wife were regarded as one person, and a conveyance to them by name was a conveyance in law to but one person. The estate rests upon the doctrine of the unity of person, and, upon the death of one, the whole belongs to the other, not solely by right of survivorship, but also by virtue of,the grant which vested the entire estate in each grantee. Long v. Barnes, 87 N. C., 329; Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y., 152. These two individuals, by virtue of their marital relationship, acquire the entire estate, and each is deemed to be seized of the whole and not of a moiety or an undivided portion thereof. They are seized of the whole, because at common law they were considered but one person; and the estate thus created has never been destroyed or changed by statute in North Carolina. Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N. C., 587. It still possesses here the same properties and incidents as at common law. Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N. C., 95. The act abolishing survivorship in joint tenancies in fee (C. S., 1735), does not apply to tenancies by entirety. Motley v. Whitemore, 19 N. C., 537. A joint estate is distinguished by the four unities of time, title, interest and possession (Moore v. Trust Co., 178 N. C., p. 124); and it has been held that in tenancies by the entirety, a fifth unity is added to the four common-law unities recognized in joint tenancies, to‘wit, unity of person. Topping v. Sadler, 50 N. C., 357.”
Two of the properties or incidents of this estate which, in view of changes in the law in conformity with changes in social conditions, has been declared by this Court to be an anomaly, are stated in Davis v. Bass as follows:
“4. Lands held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety are not subject to levy under execution on a judgment rendered against either the husband or the wife alone, nor can the interest of either be thus sold, because the right of survivorship is merely an incident of the estate, and does not constitute a remainder, either vested or contingent ; but a judgment rendered against the husband and wife jointly, upon a joint obligation, may be satisfied out of an estate in lands held by them as tenants by the entirety. Martin v. Lewis, 187 N. C., 473, 30 C. J., 573.”
*713“14. A sale by husband and wife and a division of the proceeds ends an estate by the entirety. Moore v. Trust Co., 178 N. C., 118.”'
Because of the nature of the estate, acquired by the defendant, L. H. Cutler, Sr., and his wife in the lot devised to them as tenants by the entirety, by Mrs. Sarah E. Wadsworth, and of the properties and incidents of said estate, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, "Winchester-Simmons Company and against the defendant, L. H. Cutler, Sr., was not a lien on said lot at any time during the joint lives of said L. H. Cutler, Sr., and his wife, Mrs. Laura D. Cutler, nor was said lot subject to sale under execution for the satisfaction of said judgment during said time. In Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. C., 202, 13 S. E., 790, it is said: “As we have seen, the husband, who is the judgment debtor in this case, had no interest in the land that he could dispose of, nor that was subject to sale under execution or any legal process. A sale would be ineffectual. The possibility that the husband might survive his wife and thus become the sole owner of the property, was not the subject of sale or lien. This did not constitute or create any present estate, legal or equitable, any more than a contingent remainder or any other mere prospective possibility. Bristol v. Hallyburton, 93 N. C., 384.”
If the deed executed by L. H. Cutler, Sr., and his wife, Mrs. Laura D. Cutler, by which they jointly conveyed the lot of land described in the complaint to the defendant, Miss Laura A. Eoberts, is valid, although the defendant, L. H. Cutler, Sr., has survived his wife, he had-.no interest or estate in said lot of land, at the commencement of this action, to which said judgment could attach as a lien, or which was subject to sale under execution for the satisfaction of said judgment. The lot of land was conveyed by both L. H. Cutler, Sr., and his wife, Laura D. Cutler; each at the date of their deed was seized of the whole estate in said lo.t, and not of a moiety, or of an undivided .portion thereof. Davis v. Bass, supra. It is expressly alleged in the complaint that Mrs. Laura D. Cutler did not participate or share with her husband in his purpose by the execution of said deed to hinder, delay and defraud the plaintiffs. She, at least, with the joinder of her husband, had the right to convey said lot of land to her granddaughter. The purpose of her husband, who at the date of the deed had the same interest in the land as she had — no more and no less — not disclosed to her, could not render the deed void as to her.
Nor can it be held on the facts alleged in the complaint that 'the purpose of L. H. Cutler, Sr., in executing the deed, and thereby joining with his wife in the conveyance of the land, was fraudulent, thus rendering the deed void. In Teague v. Downs, 69 N. C., 280, it' is said that as creditors of a husband had no right to subject his estate by the *714••curtesy in lands' owned by Ms wife, to the satisfaction of Ms 'debts, during the life of the wife, he was at liberty, if so minded, to surrender his .estate in said land, and that such surrender could not be held fraudulent as to his creditors. See, also, Dortch v. Benton, 98 N. C., 190, 3 S. E., 638, in which it was held that as a debtor’s homestead is not subject to sale under execution on a judgment against him, his conveyance of. the homestead was not fraudulent as to Ms creditors, although it was otherwise as to a conveyance of the land subject to the homestead. At the date of the deed from L. H. Cutler, Sr., and his wife, Laura D. Cutler, to their granddaughter, L. H. Cutler, Sr., had no interest in the land conveyed by the deed, present or prospective, which was subject to sale for the satisfaction of the judgment against him, then owned by the plaintiff, 'Winchester-Simmons Company; he had only a possibility of owning such interest or estate, contingent upon the uncertainty of his surviving his wife. This was not such an interest or estate as could be sold under execution for the satisfaction of the judgment. Bruce v. Nicholson, supra,. His conveyance of the land, with the joinder of his wife, thus surrendering his right to an estate in the land, upon his survivorship, was not fraudulent as to the plaintiffs.
It does not appear from the allegations of the complaint that the defendant, Miss Laura A. Roberts, took the title to the land conveyed to her, with a trust impressed upon her title, by the terms of the deed, or by parol. It is expressly alleged in the complaint that she did not participate, or share with the defendant, L. H. Cutler, Sr., in the pur■pose with which it is alleged he executed the deed. The decision of this Court in Davis v. Bass, supra, is, therefore, not controlling in the instant case.
We concur in the opinion of the Superior Court that the facts alleged ■in the complaint are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action on which plaintiffs are entitled to .relief in this action. The judgment is