The land in question was conveyed to trustees of the Leaksville-Spray Institute, which is a corporation. It was provided in section 4 of the charter that the first four trustees named in section 3 should hold office until the annual meeting of the incorporators in 1906; the second four until said meeting in 1907; the third four until said meeting in 1908; and that their successors should be elected for a term of three years from the date of their election. There is no provision in the charter that the trustees shall hold office until their successors are elected and qualified, and no one has been elected to succeed any of the trustees originally named in the charter. Private Laws 1905, ch. 185; Private Laws 1907, ch. 104. As said in the judgment, the only questions for decision are whether the trustees first appointed continued in office by virtue of their original, appointment and whether they could authorize the execution of the deed of trust and make a conveyance to the plaintiffs.
With respect to tenure of office the general rule is that the failure of a corporate body to elect officers or directors does not end the terms of those previously elected. S. v. Guertin, 130 A. S. R., 610; Trustees of Vernon Soc. v. Hills, 16 A. D., 429; Treasurer of State v. Mann, 80 A. D., 688; Quitman Oil Co. v. Peacock, 81 S. E. (Ga.), 908. In the present case the trustees continued without objection to perform the duties imposed upon them, and apparently there was no desire on the part of the corporation to displace them by the election of others. No *695one except tbe corporation could be beard to complain, and the corporation not only did not complain, but seemed to sanction their continuance in office.
The charter authorized the trustees to hold real and personal property for the corporation; the trustees authorized the execution of the deed of trust and the conveyance to the plaintiffs of the land in controversy. When these three tracts were purchased they were conveyed, not to the corporation eo nomine, but to the trustees. All the living trustees, holding the legal title, conveyed the land to the plaintiffs. Thé' corporation duly executed to B. E. Ivie, trustee, the deed of trust under which the property was sold by the trustees and purchased by the plaintiffs. As was said in Burns v. McGregor, 90 N. C., 222, it would contravene the plainest principles of justice to allow the corporation to get the benefit of the money secured by the deed of trust and then repudiate its act on the ground of its invalidity. But the corporation does not repudiate its conveyance. Nor do the trustees of Leaksville-Spray Institute undertake to repudiate theirs. The conveyances executed by these parties respectively conveyed to the plaintiffs the legal title and the beneficial or equitable interest in the property in suit. Neither the corporation nor the trustees can now claim any interest in it.
The plaintiffs, therefore, can convey an indefeasible title and the defendant is bound by its contract to accept the deed tendered it by the plaintiffs, and to pay the price agreed for the purchase. Judgment
Affirmed.