In Leak v. Armfield, 187 N. C., at p. 628, it is said: “The mortgage is not a ‘scrap of paper.’ It is a legal contract that the parties are bound by. The courts, under their equitable jurisdiction, where the amount is due and ascertained — no fraud or mistake, etc., alleged — have no power to impair the solemn instrument directly or indirectly by nullifying the plain provisions by restraining the sale to be made under the terms of the mortgage.”
The plaintiffs are creditors of the estate of S. M. Blacknall, deceased. Mildred ~W. Purvis is administratrix of the estate with the will annexed. It is alleged that she took from the assets of the estate $10,000 and paid it to Gladys Pegram and Charles H. Blacknall, to pay her individual debt and then in her individual capacity made the $10,000 deed of trust-on the sixteen tracts of land willed to her by S. M. Blacknall, but at the time the estate was heavily indebted and before the two years had expired to settle the estate, under the statute, C. S., 76. As to the charge that the $10,000 payment to Gladys Pegram and Charles H. Blacknall was taken from the estate of S. M. Blacknall by the administratrix, Mildred W. Purvis, if .the estate is insolvent, and there is not sufficient assets to pay plaintiff’s debts, it may be that plaintiffs can recover the amount from Gladys Pegram and Charles H. Blacknall.
In Wood v. Bank, ante, 373, citing numerous authorities, we find the following: “It is well settled that where one’s property has been purloined by actionable fraud or covin, the law permits him to follow it and recover it from the wrongdoer, or from any one to whom it has been transferred otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration, so long as it can be identified or traced; and the principle applies to money and choses in action as well as to specific property.”
C. S., 76, is as follows: “All conveyances of real property of any decedent made by any devisee or heir at law, within two years from the grant of letters, shall be void as to the creditors, executors, administrators and collectors of such decedent; but such conveyances to bona fide purchasers for value and without notice, if made after two years from the grant of letters, shall be valid even as against creditors.”
In construing the above statute this Court, in Davis v. Perry, 96 N. C., at p. 262-3, says: “The statute (The Code, sec. 1442) (O. S., 76), provides that a deed thus made, and indeed all like conveyances made by devisees and heirs at law, ‘within two years from the grant of letters, shall be void as to creditors, executors, administrators, and collectors’ of the deceased debtor. But this does not imply that such conveyances are absolutely void and inoperative at all events. The contrary appears from *624the terms, nature, and purpose of the statute. They are only void in any ease as to creditors and personal representatives, and as to them, only in case the personal assets are insufficient to pay the debts and costs of administration; they are not void — they never cease to operate as to the parties to them; nor are they void or inoperative as to the bona fide purchasers for value, and without notice, if made after two years from the grant of letters — indeed, in that case, they are ‘Valid even against creditors.’ They are never primarily void ah initio; they become so only to the extent, and in the cases and contingencies prescribed by the statute; but when the voidness supervenes to the extent indicated, it must prevail per force of the statute; it relates back to the time when the deed or other conveyance first became operative. It seems to be that this is the obvious and necessary interpretation of the statute referred to above.”
With the law as above stated, the deed of trust from Mildred W. Purvis to J. P. Zollicoffer, trustee for Gladys Pegram and Charles H. Blacknall, is good between the parties for what interest she has in the land, subject to be divested by the creditors of the estate, if the estate is insolvent. It may be for the best interest of all parties that the judgment of the court below be sustained, but the defendant, Charles H. Blacknall, demands his legal right that the interest that Mildred W. Purvis has in the land which she made a deed of trust to J. P. Zollicoffer, trustee, to secure her debt to him, be sold, and we must so hold. As often said, “Hard cases are the quicksands of the law.” Charles H. Blacknall has a legal right which a court of equity, under the facts in this case, cannot interfere with. The judgment of the court below is
Reversed.