Was tbe judgment rendered in Jackson County on 10 November, 1916, and not docketed in Swain County until May, 1929, dead when docketed?
If tbe judgment was dead when docketed in Swain County, then tbe act of docketing in such county did not breathe into it tbe breath of life. Tbe defendant, however, contends tbat tbe judgment was not a final judgment for tbe reason that it created a lien “payable out of such interest as sbe may bave or be entitled to in tbe estate of her grandfather, W. H. Tbomas, Sr., and payable only out of any sum which may be due or hereafter become due to ber from her interest or distributive share in tbe said estate.” Hence tbe judgment contemplated a sale of property at sometime in tbe future and consequently tbe statute of limitations would not run until such sale.
We do not concur in this reasoning. The record discloses tbat tbe judgment purports to be a final judgment. Tbe defendant could bave issued an execution upon said judgment at any time. Indeed, it seems *209apparent that the judgment was intended to constitute a lien upon the land of feme plaintiff exclusively and to be interpreted and construed solely as a charge upon her distributive share. The property out of which the judgment was to be paid was then in existence and subject to execution.
As we construe the judgment, it was a charge upon the interest of' said plaintiff in the land, and no more, and it is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action to enforce a charge upon land is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. Newsome v. Harrell, 168 N. C., 295, 84 S. E., 337; Cochran v. Colson, 192 N. C., 663, 135 S. E., 794.
We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment was dead when docketed and that the trial judge erroneously rendered judgment for the defendant.
Reversed.
Stacy, C. J., and Connoe, J., dissent.