Teasley v. Burwell, 199 N.C. 18 (1930)

June 16, 1930 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

199 N.C. 18

MRS. KATE TEASLEY and H. M. TEASLEY v. H. W. BURWELL and MRS. H. W. BURWELL.

(Filed 16 June, 1930.)

1. Highways B i — Testimony of cautions given the driver by guest injured in accident held competent on question of negligence.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while riding in an automobile as a guest of the defendant, caused by the alleged negligent driving of the defendant, testimony that the plaintiff had cautioned the defendant about her manner of driving immediately preceding the accident is competent as evidence with.other evidence tending to establish the fact of negligence.

2. Trial E c — Instruction in this case held sufficiently full.

Where the law arising from the evidence introduced upon the trial of an action is simple in its application and not disputed, the trial judge in his instructions to the jury does not commit reversible error in failing to go into great elaboration of detail when the jury must have understood the application of the law to the evidence and the issues. O. S., 564.

Appeal by defendant, Mrs. II. W. Burwell, from Shaw, J., at October Term, 1929, of MecicleNBURG.

No error.

Actions by tbe plaintiffs to recover of tbe defendants damages resulting to eacb of them from personal injuries sustained by tbe plaintiff, Mrs. Kate TeasleyJ wife of tbe plaintiff, H. M. Teasley, and caused, as alleged in tbe complaints therein, by tbe negligence of tbe defendant, Mrs. H. W. Burwell, while driving an automobile owned by her bus-band, tbe defendant, H. W. Burwell, were by consent consolidated for trial of tbe issues raised by tbe pleadings.

Tbe issues submitted to tbe jury were answered as follows:

“1. Were tbe plaintiffs injured by tbe negligence of tbe defendants, or of either of tbem, and if so, wbicb one, as alleged in tbe complaint? Answer: Yes, Mrs. Burwell.

2. What damages, if any, is tbe plaintiff, Mrs. Kate Teasley, entitled to recover ? Answer: $2,200.

3. Wbat damages, if any, is tbe plaintiff, H. M. Teasley, entitled to recover? Answer: $150.

From judgment in accordance with tbe verdict, tbe defendant, Mrs. H. W. Burwell, appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

J óhn M. Robinson and Hunter M. J ones for plaintiffs.

J. Laurence J ones for defendants.

CoNNob, J.

On 15 December, 1928, tbe plaintiff, Mrs. Kate Teasley, was injured when tbe automobile in wbicb sbe was riding on a public road in Mecklenburg County, near tbe city of Charlotte, struck tbe guard rail of a bridge, across tbe road, at tbe foot of a bill, and turned over. Tbe automobile was owned by tbe defendant, H. W. Burwell, who> however, was not in tbe automobile at tbe time plaintiff was injured; it was driven by bis wife, tbe defendant, Mrs. H. W. Burwell. Mrs. Teasley was tbe guest of Mrs. Burwell. Tbe jury found that Mrs. Burwell was not driving tbe automobile at tbe time tbe plaintiff was injured as tbe agent of her husband, tbe owner, and that therefore be is not liable to tbe plaintiffs for tbe damages wbicb resulted to each of tbem from tbe injuries sustained by Mrs. Teasley.

There is no contention on this appeal that tbe evidence offered by tbe plaintiffs at tbe trial was not sufficient to sustain tbe allegations in tbe complaint that each of tbe plaintiffs was injured by tbe negligence of Mrs. Burwell while driving tbe automobile in wbicb Mrs. Teasley was riding as her guest, and that both tbe plaintiffs suffered damages as tbe result of her injuries.

Tbe contention that there was error in tbe admission of evidence tending to show that Mrs. Burwell was cautioned by each of tbe plaintiffs as to tbe manner in wbicb sbe was driving tbe automobile, a short time before it struck tbe bridge and turned over, thus causing tbe injuries to Mrs. Teasley, cannot be sustained. This evidence was competent as tending to show that Mrs. Burwell was driving tbe automobile negligently, not only at tbe time tbe caution was given, but also at tbe time plaintiff was injured. Only a few moments intervened between tbe time Mrs. Burwell was cautioned as to tbe manner in wbicb sbe was driving and tbe accident. In Harbison v. Barwinskey (Conn.), 124 Atl., 223, it is said: “Any direction or suggestion made to tbe driver of tbe car concerning bis conduct in tbe operation of tbe car was a circumstance to be considered in weighing that conduct. What be did, and wbat be was warned or asked not to do, and wbat caution was given bim, were all relevant and material upon tbe issue of bis negligence.” Upon tbe facts shown by tbe evidence, there was no error in tbe admission of this evidence.

There is no contention by appellant that there was error in tbe instructions as given by tbe court in its charge to tbe jury. Her contentions that tbe court failed to instruct tbe jury that tbe negligence of Mrs. Burwell in driving tbe automobile in violation of certain statutes, was not actionable unless such negligence was tbe proximate cause of tbe injuries sustained by tbe plaintiffs, and also failed to instruct tbe jury with respect to tbe law applicable to tbe issues involving tbe damages which tbe plaintiffs were entitled to recover, if tbe jury should answer tbe first issue “Yes,” cannot be sustained. An examination of tbe entire charge shows a substantial compliance by tbe judge with tbe requirements of C. S., 564. When tbe facts involved in tbe issues are few and simple, and tbe principles of law applicable to these facts are well settled, and not controverted, as in tbe instant case, tbe statute does not require that tbe judge shall give elaborate instructions to tbe jury. He is required only to “state in a plain and correct manner tbe evidence given in tbe case, and explain tbe law arising thereon.” Under tbe practice in this State, tbe charge is given after counsel for tbe parties to tbe action have argued to the jury tbe whole case, as well of law as of fact. C. S., 203. When there is no controversy between counsel as to tbe law involved in tbe issues, and they so state to tbe jury, as was doubtless done in this ease, it is needless for tbe judge to go beyond tbe requirements of tbe statute in bis charge to tbe jury. Elaborate instructions as to tbe law applicable to tbe facts which tbe jury may find from tbe evidence, often confuse rather than aid tbe jury. Tbe criticism of tbe charge of tbe learned and experienced judge who presided at tbe trial of tbe issues which were determinative of tbe rights of tbe parties to this action is not, we think, well grounded. Tbe judgment is affirmed.

No error.