Tbe question involved: Should tbe order adjudging defendant in contempt of court bave been signed over tbe objection of defendant from tbe record as appears in tbe ease ? We think not.
Chapter 17, Consolidated Statutes, under “Contempt,” tbe pertinent provision to tbe present controversy, is C. S., 978: “Any person guilty of any of tbe following acts may be punished for contempt: (4) Wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any court.” It will be noted that to punish for contempt in a matter of this kind, there must be wilful disobedience. We think tbe decision binges on tbe meaning of wilful disobedience.
In S. v. Whitener, 93 N. C., at p. 592, speaking to tbe subject: “Tbe word wilful, used in a statute creating a criminal offense, means something more than an intention to do a thing. It implies tbe doing tbe act purposely and deliberately, indicating a purpose to do it, without au7 tbority — careless whether be has tbe right or not — -in violation of law, and it is this which makes tbe criminal intent, without which one cannot be brought within the meaning of a criminal statute.”
In S. v. Banks, 143 N. C., 657, we find: “The word ‘wilful,’ when used in a statute creating an offense, implies tbe doing of tbe act purposely and deliberately in violation of law.” In S. v. Faulkner, 182 N. C., p. 798, it is said: “Tbe term unlawfully implies that an act is done, or not done, as tbe law allows, or requires; while tbe term wil-fully implies that tbe act is done knowingly and of stubborn purpose.”
In Truelove v. Parker, 191 N. C., at p. 438, it is written: “By tbe terms of tbe statute it is necessary that such abandonment be wilful— that is, accomplished purposely and deliberately in violation of law.” S. v. Morgan, 136 N. C., 630; Brittain v. R. R., 167 N. C., 642.
Tbe evidence we doubt sufficient to show that defendant’s noncompliance with tbe rule was wilful, as that word has been frequently defined by tbe decisions of this Court. As a contemnor is liable to be imprisoned tbe rule that a criminal statute should be strictly construed is applicable.
In re Odum, 133 N. C., at p. 251-2, it is. said: “Tbe facts should bave been found and filed in tbe proceedings, especially that fact con--cerning tbe purpose and object of tbe contemnor, and tbe judgment should bave been founded on those findings.” We do not think tbe court below found facts sufficient to base tbe judgment on. For tbe reasons given, tbe judgment is
Reversed.