Tbe record discloses tbat tbe plaintiff was a graduate of a junior college and engaged in teaching school. On 16 April, 1929, at tbe time of exchanging cars, plaintiff signed an affidavit which contained a statement tbat tbe Oldsmobile be received from tbe defendant was a 1925 model. He testified tbat be signed this paper-writing upon tbe representation of tbe bookkeeper of defendant tbat a controversy bad arisen between “tbe Oldsmobile people and tbe State of North Carolina-, tbat it was sold as a, 1925 model, and tbe State of. North Carolina gave title for the year tbe car was sold and not for tbe model of tbe ear.” Plaintiff further testified: “I drove tbe car some before I traded for it. . . . After I bad tried it out I told them to go ahead and fix up tbe papers, and I signed tbe papers at Spruce Pine witb an explanation which tbe bookkeeper gave to me. ... I bad every opportunity to *99look into tbe car and investigate it, but Mr. Sbuford said it was in good condition, and I took bis word for it.”
We do not tbink tbe evidence of fraud was sufficient to be submitted to tbe jury. It is obvious from tbe evidence tbat tbe parties bad equal means of information, and tbat tbe plaintiff was not prevented from making a full and tborougb examination and test of tbe property before tbe contract was entered into. Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N. C., 685, 143 S. E., 525; Cromwell v. Logan et al., 196 N. C., 588, 146 S. E., 233.
Affirmed.