The only allegation of negligence against the defendant, Capeheart, was that his car, referred to in the evidence as the Buick or orange colored car, was parked on the highway in violation of C. S., 2621 (66). There was evidence to the effect that rain was falling and that the defendant, Capeheart, had stopped his car to wipe off the windshield. There was evidence also to the effect that his car was entirely on the pavement, and there was also evidence that his car was partially on the dirt shoulder and partially on the pavement. Assuming, but not deciding, that it is ai negligent act to thus stop a car on the highway to wipe off the windshield, there is no evidence that such violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff’s intestate. The car in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding did not collide with the Capeheart car, and all the evidence was to the effect that sufficient space was left to enable the driver of the Essex car, in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding, to pass the car of defendant Capeheart without injury or inconvenience. The plaintiff relies upon the case of Dickey v. R. R., *12196 N. C., 726, 147 S. E., 15. It must be observed, however, that in the Dickey case the ear in which the injured party was riding actually collided with the train standing across the street in violation of an ordinance. So that, the principle of law declared by the Court has no application to the facts disclosed in the present record, and the judgment of nonsuit as to defendant Capeheart must be sustained.
However, the plaintiff insists that there is sufficient evidence of negligence against the defendant, Coach Company, to carry the case to the jury. The only allegations in the pleadings with respect to the negligence of this defendant are to the effect that the bus was being driven at an excessive speed in violation of C. S., 2618, 2621 (46)a, and C. S., 2621 (51) ; and further, that the driver thereof did not keep a proper lookout. The evidence discloses that Mrs. A. B. Pritchard was driving an Essex car toward 'Winston-Salem, and that plaintiff’s intestate was riding as a guest therein. Plaintiff alleged as the cause of the collision that “said Mrs. A. B. Pritchard, necessarily in proceeding along the highway, had to attempt to pass to the left of defendant’s, Dr. L. B. Oapeheart’s, automobile; that while she was attempting to do so in the exercise of due care the motor bus of defendant, Carolina Coach Company, being operated at an unlawful and excessive rate of speed, as above set forth, collided with the automobile in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding; that as a result of said collision plaintiff’s intestate received injury, from which he died in less than two hours thereafter.” The evidence discloses that the Essex car in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding was struck by the bus about the center thereof and on the left-hand side thereof. In other words, the left-hand side of the bus struck the center of the left-hand side of the Essex car. The evidence further disclosed that the Essex car was struck on the right-hand side of the road, traveling east toward Durham; that is to say, the collision took place on the side of the road properly and lawfully occupied by the bus and on the side that the bus is required by law to travel. When the bus stopped it was almost entirely off the hard surface, and there was testimony to the effect that if it had rolled any further it would have gone into the ditch on its right side. The evidence also disclosed that the bus stopped within its length, and that when the bus stopped the Essex car was hooked up to its front, and the car of defendant Capeheart was standing about the rear of the bus.
There was evidence that in a dip about 300 yards from the point of the collision the bus was running between 45 and 50 miles an hour. There is no evidence as to the speed of the bus immediately preceding the collision. Furthermore, the fact that a heavy bus stopped on a slick surface within its own length must require a stretch of the imagination in order to support a theory that it was running 50 miles an hour at the *13time of tbe impact. If it be conceded tba.t the bus was violating the speed limit at the time of the injury, still the vital question involved is whether the speed was the proximate cause of the injury under the facts disclosed in the record. The theory of the collision alleged in the complaint is that the car in which plaintiff’s intestate was riding was attempting to pass the Capeheart car. If so, it was struck by the bus before it completed the act of passing. Therefore, it must be manifest that the bus was perilously near the Capeheart car when Mrs. Pritchard attempted to pass. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that after the bus stopped the Capeheart ear was located slightly beyond the center of the bus.
There is no evidence as to how the injury occurred, and the mere fact of the injury is in itself ordinarily no evidence of negligence. “The breach of a statute is negligence per se, but there must be a causal connection between the disregard of the statute and the injury inflicted.” Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C., 125, 81 S. E., 1066. Again it has been held in Chancey v. R. R., 174 N. C., 351, 93 S. E., 834, that “the rule was recently stated to be, that however negligent a party is, if his act stands in no causal relation to the injury, it is not actionable.” The rule was further stated in Austin v. R. R., 197 N. C., 321, as follows: “There is evidence that death was caused by the impact of the train, but this is not enough to make actionable negligence. Negligence is not presumed from the mere fact that the intestate was killed.” In McNeill v. R. R., 167 N. C., 390, 83 S. E., 704, the plaintiff’s intestate was killed by a train running without a headlight in violation of the law. The Court wrote: “It is not the. absence of the headlight, nor the impact of the train, which determines liability, but the impact of the train brought about by or as the proximate result of the absence of a headlight. To illustrate: Suppose one is at work on an overhead bridge, and without fault on his part he falls on the track 5 feet in front of a rapidly moving train, which is running at night without a headlight, and is killed? Here we have negligence in the failure to have a headlight; but there can be no recovery, because the same result would have followed if there had been a headlight, and its absence has had nothing to do with the injury.” Elder v. R. R., 194 N. C., 617, 140 S. E., 298.
In the oral argument plaintiff took the position that there was evidence that the bus was traveling on the wrong side of the road. This position was based upon the testimony of Mrs. Holland, who testified in regard to certain skid marks on the road. She said: “It started in the middle of the road, and the right-hand wheels went clear off the asphalt. I saw one line for the left wheels and one for the right. The one for the right wheel started in the center and went clear off the asphalt. The left one started in the center and followed this wheel.” From these *14statements it is argued that i£ tbe skid mark made by tbe bus, for tbe right wheel, started in tbe center and went clear off tbe asphalt, or that if tbe right-hand wheels of tbe bus were in tbe center of tbe road, then of necessity tbe left-hand wheels were beyond tbe center in violation of tbe law. This theory overlooks tbe next statement of witness, which is: “Tbe left one started in tbe center and followed this wheel.” So that, as a matter of fact, tbe testimony of witness clearly discloses that the skid marks for all wheels started in tbe center of tbe road. Moreover, there was no allegation in tbe complaint that tbe bus was traveling on tbe wrong side of tbe road.
Upon all tbe evidence we are of tbe opinion that tbe judgment of non-suit as to both defendants was correct.