At tbe trial in tbe General County Court tbe judge found tbe following facts:
“1. Tbat on or about 18 December, 1928, one A. T. Dallas, being then tbe owner of a certain Oakland coupe, described in tbe pleadings, refinanced tbe same with Allport Motor Company, and not having suffi*758cient credit bimself induced tbe plaintiff to use bis name in refinancing said car, and tbe original certificate of title from tbe Revenue Department of tbe State of North Carolina to Dallas was assigned to tbe plaintiff on or about 18 December, 1928, and left in tbe files of tbe Allport Motor Company with instructions to send to tbe State Department for tbe issuance of a new title in tbe name of tbe plaintiff, wbicb was finally accomplished on 4 September, 1929.
2. That tbe said Dallas being indebted to tbe plaintiff, on or about 18 January, 1929, executed and delivered to tbe plaintiff a mortgage on said Oakland automobile, securing $864, wbicb mortgage was not recorded until 8 August, 1929.
3. That A. T. Dallas was permitted to continue to use tbe car and tbe same continued in bis possession until 6 May, 1929.
4. That tbe plaintiff paid tbe installments on tbe refinancing mortgage as they matured.
5. That tbe plaintiff authorized tbe said A. T. Dallas to deal with tbe car as bis own, allowing him to sell it if be could, provided plaintiff should be paid all amounts due him.
6. That on or about 6 May, 1929, in pursuance of a transaction negotiated by Dallas and E. 0. Mitchell, salesman for tbe defendant, Cona-beer Motor Company, tbe said Dallas delivered to tbe defendant tbe automobile in question stating at tbe time to defendant’s agent that be could not deliver title, but that title would have to be obtained from tbe plaintiff.
7. That tbe value of tbe Oakland automobile at tbe time of delivery to tbe defendant was $600, and it is agreed by tbe parties that tbe same has not materially deteriorated since.
8. That at tbe time of tbe institution of this action tbe plaintiff bad not delivered title to tbe defendant, and tbe defendant bad not satisfied tbe debt claimed by Chandler against A. T. Dallas.”
Upon tbe foregoing facts, it was adjudged by tbe General County Court that tbe plaintiff, E. T. Chandler, is tbe owner and entitled to tbe immediate possession of tbe Oakland coupe described in tbe complaint. Defendant excepted to tbe judgment, and on bis appeal to tbe Superior Court assigned as error tbe refusal of tbe court to dismiss tbe action as upon nonsuit, at tbe close of all tbe evidence. On bis appeal to this Court defendant contends that there was error in tbe refusal of tbe judge of tbe Superior Court to sustain bis assignment' of error, and in tbe judgment affirming tbe judgment of tbe General County Court. Neither of these contentions can be sustained.
There was evidence at tbe trial in tbe General County Court sufficient to support tbe findings of fact made by tbe judge of said court. These findings of fact are, therefore, conclusive for all purposes in this action. *759 Colvard v. Dicus Bros., ante, 270, 151 S. E., 191; Holmes Electric Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 197 N. C., 766, 150 S. E., 621; Eley v. R. R., 165 N. C., 78, 80 S. E., 1064. It appears from these facts that plaintiff is tbe owner and entitled to tbe possession of tbe automobile by virtue of tbe chattel mortgage executed by A. T. Dallas on 18 January, 1929. Hinson v. Smith, 118 N. C., 503, 24 S. E., 541.
Tbe fact that tbe mortgage was not registered at the date of tbe delivery of tbe automobile to tbe defendant by tbe mortgagor, in tbe absence of a finding that tbe defendant is a purchaser for value, is immaterial. Music Store v. Boone, 197 N. C., 174, 148 S. E., 39. There was no evidence at tbe trial from which tbe judge could have found that defendant is a purchaser of tbe automobile for value from tbe mortgagor, or from one claiming under tbe mortgagor as a purchaser for value.
There is, therefore, no error in tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court . affirming tbe judgment of tbe General County Court. Tbe judgment is
Affirmed.