after stating the case: It is questionable as to whether the evidence is sufficient to show that the truck which injured the plaintiff belonged to the defendant, Carolina Truck Transportation Company, and that the driver of the truck was about the business of said defendant at the time of the injury; but, however this may be, and conceding for the moment that such inferences are permissible,r still we think the plaintiff has failed to make out a case of liability against the corporate defendant, in that, no evidence has been offered to show that the driver was acting within the scope of bis employment in taking the boys on the truck for a ride. Dover v. Manufacturing Co., 157 N. C., 324, 72 S. E., 1067. If the defendant Eoy bad invited the plaintiff to ride with him on other occasions, there is no evidence that the corporate defendant knew it. In this respect Fry v. Utilities Co., 183 N. C., 281, 111 S. E., 354, is distinguishable.
It is neither alleged, nor shown by the evidence, that George Eoy, when driving for the defendant company, bad any authority, express or *711implied, to invite or to permit boys to ride on tbe defendant’s truck. Without suck authority, express or implied, the invitation of the driver, even if given, was apparently beyond "the scope of his employment, and it is well settled that the master, is not liable for the acts of his servant which transcend the legitimate "sphere of his employment and are not done in furtherance of the master’s business. Wilkie v. Stancil, 196 N. C., 794, 147 S. E., 296; Ferguson v. Spinning Co., 196 N. C., 614, 146 S. E., 597; Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C., 760, 135 S. E., 852; Bilyeu v. Beck, 178 N. C., 481, 100 S. E., 891; Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C., 95, 77 S. E., 1096; Daniel v. R. R., 136 N. C., 517, 48 S. E., 816.
Speaking to the subject in Sawyer v. R. R., 142 N. C., 1, 54 S. E., 793, the following was quoted with approval from Wood on Master and Servant, sec. 279, p. 535:
“The question usually presented is whether," as "a matter of fact or of law, the injury was received under such circumstances that, under the employment the master can be"said to have authorized the act; for if he did not, either in fact or in law, he cannot be made chargeable for its consequences, because not having been done under authority from him, express or implied, it can in no sense be said to be his act, and the maxim previously referred to (respondeat superior) does not apply. The test of liability in all cases depends upon the question whether the injury was committed by the authority of the master, expressly conferred or fairly implied from the nature of the employment and the duties incident to-it.”
'And, again, the same author, in section 307, says:
“The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may fairly be said to have been authorized by him. By ‘authorized’ is not meant authority expressly conferred, but whether the act was such as was incident to the performance of the duties entrusted to him by the master, even though in opposition to his express and positive orders.”
To like effect is the following from Marlowe v. Bland, 154 N. C., 140, 69 S. E., 752: “An act is within the scope of the servant’s employment, where necessary to accomplish the purpose of his employment, and intended for that purpose, although in excess of the powers actually conferred on the servant by the master. The purpose of the act rather than its method of performance is the test of the scope of employment. But the act cannot be said to be within the scope of the employment merely because the injuries complained of would not have been committed without the facilities afforded by the servant’s relations to his master, nor because the servant supposed that he possessed authority to do the act in *712question.” See, also, Elmore v. R. R., 189 N. C., 658, 127 S. E., 710, and cases there cited.
Nothing was said in Misenheimer v. Hayman, 195 N. C., 613, 143 S. E., 1, or Hayes v. Creamery Co., 195 N. C., 113, 141 S. E., 340, both strongly relied upon by plaintiff, which, when properly applied, militates against our present position or is in conflict with any of the eases above cited. In the first, it is expressly stated that to hold the master liable for the tort of the servant, the plaintiff must show “that the driver of the truck was acting within the scope of his authority and in furtherance of his employer’s business,” citing as authority for the position: Freeman v. Dalton, 183 N. C., 538, 111 S. E., 863, and Clark v. Sweaney, 176 N. C., 529, 97 S. E., 474. In the second, the whole question was whether the prohibitory rule of the master had been so persistently and openly violated as to amount to its abrogation. If so, the master was deemed to' have had knowledge of its violation and to have acquiesced in its abrogation, thus impliedly authorizing the acts of the servant. Fry v. Utilities Co., supra.
On the record, we think the action against the Carolina Truck Transportation Company should be dismissed as in ease of nonsuit.
Reversed.