The appellants argue in limine that the grantors in the deed conveyed the land therein described directly to the living children of Andrew Waller, reserving to him the use of the land for his life without the creation of an intervening estate of freehold; that as there is no conveyance to Waller there can be no remainder vested or contingent; and that the children born after the execution of the deed can have no interest in the property. This argument, we presume, is founded on the phraseology of the deed; more particularly, no doubt, on the words, “We do lend to him during his life.”
An effective deed must, of course, contain operative words of conveyance — -words which indicate the grantor’s intention to convey his property; but the absence either in deeds or in wills of technical operative words will not usually be regarded as adequate cause for defeating an intention which is found upon examination of the whole instrument to be plainly though untechnically expressed. It was remarked in Elliott v. Jefferson, 133 N. C., 207, 214, that no rule can be invoked, no matter how correct in its general application, that tends to defeat the intention of the grantor. Henry Waller and his wife no doubt regarded the word “lend” as synonymous with the word “convey,” their manifest purpose being to convey to Andrew Waller an estate for his life. This is the meaning frequently given the word in the construction of wills. Smith v. Smith, 173 N. C., 124; Robeson v. Moore, 168 N. C., 388. It is the meaning given it by this Court in the construction of a deed. Edgerton v. Aycock, 123 N. C., 134.
Andrew Waller having taken a life estate, our decision involving the controversy of the remaindermen will be controlled by the case of Powell v. Powell, 168 N. C., 561. In its distinctive features the deed there construed is almost identical with the one now under consideration, the difference being a provision in the former that in the event of the death of any tine of the remaindermen during the existence of the life estate his interest should go to his surviving child or children — a provision similar to that in Mercer v. Downs, 191 N. C., 203, and in Trust Co. v. Stevenson, 196 N. C., 29. The absence of this provision in the deed before us does not affect the construction or the decisive point. The decision in Powell v. Powell, supra, is based upon the law as stated by Pearson, C. J., in Dupree v. Dupree, 45 N. C., 164, 168: “A bequest or use limited to the children of A. passes only to such children as A. has at the time (and we will suppose that a child en ventre would be included); but a bequest or use limited to the children of A., after an estate to her for life, remains open, so as to take in all the children she may have at her death. And this class of cases is put on the ground, that by reason of the life estate, it does not become necessary to fix the legal ownership until the death of the taker of the first estate.” *511It was accordingly beld in an opinion written by Allen, J., that all the children who were living at the termination of the life estate had an interest as remaindermen, whether born before or after the execution of the deed. This decision, supported by the authorities therein cited, is conclusive on the question now under discussion. The judgment is