The defendants, at the close of plaintiff’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence, moved for judgment as in case of nonsuit. C. S., 567. The court below refused the motions and in this *390we tbink there was no error. Without repeating, in our opinion, there was sufficient evidence to go to The jury as to the negligence of both defendants.
The. court below charged correctly the law of negligence and proximate cause, also as to damages, and charged, in part, as follows: “The burden is on the plaintiff to satisfy you by the greater weight of the evidence that these defendants were negligent and that such negligence was.the proximate cause of the-injury and damage to the cotton and if it has so satisfied you,. then it would be your duty to answer the issue, Yes. If the plaintiff has satisfied you that both of these railway companies were negligent and such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the cotton, then you would answer the fourth and fifth issues, Yes. If the plaintiff has failed to satisfy you that both were negligent and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the iujury, then you would answer the fourth and fifth issues, No. If plaintiff has satisfied you that one company was negligent, but failed to satisfy you that the other was negligent, then you would answer that issue, Yes. If. plaintiff fails to satisfy you as to the negligence of either company, then you can answer both issues, the fourth and fifth.issues, No. You can answer the issues Yes against the Southern and No against the C. & N. W., or you can answer the issue Yes against the C. &‘N. W., and No against the Southern, or both Yes or both No.”
From the verdict of the jury on the second and third issues, the defendants were liable only as a warehouseman. See Edwards v. Power Co., 193 N. C., 780. On this aspect, the court charged, we think, the law applicable to the facts.
The liability of a carrier for loss or damage is well stated in Moore on Carriers, (2 ed.), Yol. 1, at p. 306, as follows: “The liability of a carrier of goods is that of a common carrier, which is that of an insurer; and in cases of loss of or injury to goods intrusted to it for transportation no excuse avails such carrier, except that such loss or injury was occasioned by the act of God, or the public enemies of the State, or the sole fault of the owner or his agent. The law adjudges the carrier responsible, irrespective of any question of negligence or fault on his part, if the loss does not occur by the act, of God or the public enemies. With these exceptions, the carrier is an insurer against all losses.”
The case was tried carefully by the court below and from a painstaking review of the record, we can find
No error.