after stating the case: Conceding, without deciding, that the cashier of the Snow Hill Banking and Trust Company was not authorized by the payee to endorse the check in question, still we think the plaintiff must fail in his suit, if not upon the principle of ratification, then upon the doctrine of estoppel. The law will not permit him to take and to hold the fruits of what was done for him by the cashier of the bank and at the same time repudiate its consequences. Bank v. Justice, 157 N. C., 373, 72 S. E., 1016.
The substance of ratification is confirmation after conduct. 2 C. J., 467; Parks v. Trust Co., 195 N. C., 453, 142 S. E., 473; Waggoner v. Pub. Co., 190 N. C., 829, 130 S. E., 609. Here, the plaintiff, an intelligent business man, on being informed that the amount of his loan had been placed to his credit, proceeded to draw upon the deposit and to use it as his own. He must have known that the cashier had done whatever was necessary to place the funds to his credit. His conduct, under the circumstances, was tantamount to an adoption and confirmation of the endorsement made by the cashier who assumed to act as his agent at the time. Starkweather v. Gravely, 187 N. C., 526, 122 S. E., 297. He ought not to be heard now in repudiation of his previous conduct. Lewis v. Nunn, 180 N. C., 159, 104 S. E., 470.
“If certain acts have been performed or contracts made on behalf of another without his authority he has, when he obtains knowledge thereof, an election either to accept or repudiate such acts or contracts. If he accept them, his acceptance is a ratification of the previously unauthorized acts or contracts, and makes them as binding upon him from the time they were performed as if they had been authorized in the first place.” Gallup v. Liberty County, 57 Tex. Civ. App., 175, 122 S. W., 291.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on an application of the golden rule to the everyday affairs of men. It requires that one should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, he would have them do unto him, if their positions were reversed. Boddie v. Bond, 154 N. C., 359, 70 S. E., 824; 10 R. C. L., 688 et seq. Its compulsion is one of fair play.
*100He>wbo is silent when it is bis duty to speak, will not be permitted by tbe law to speak wben sucb silence bas made it bis duty thereafter to remain speechless. Hardware Co. v. Lewis, 173 N. C., 290, 92 S. E., 13.
Upon tbe record we think tbe defendants’ motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been allowed.
Beversed.