Plaintiff, W. P. Jennings, was tbe landlord, B. E. Alford was tbe supply merchant. G. T. Garner was Jenning’s tenant. Henry Horne was a subtenant of Garner on Jennings’ 'land. Horne sued Garner and Alford in a justice of tbe peace court for $200. Tbe defendant Heel in tbis action was attorney for Garner in tbat suit. Judgment,was rendered for Horne against botb Garner and Alford. They appealed to tbe Superior Court. Plaintiff in tbis action signed Garner’s appeal bond and testified, “I signed the bond with Mr. Keel’s assurance that he would save me from loss or cost.” In tbe Superior Court Horne obtained a judgment for $200 against Garner and bis surety, Jennings, on tbe appeal bond. Jennings, wbo bad to pay tbe judgment after execution was issued against bim, now sues Keel on bis promise. Tbis promise was denied by Keel and be pleaded tbe statute of frauds, C. S., 987, as follows: “No action shall be brought whereby to charge an executor, administrator or collector upon a special promise to answer damages out of bis own estate or to charge any defendant upon a special promise to answer tbe debt, default or miscarriage of another person, unless tbe agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by tbe party charged therewith or some other person thereunto by bim lawfully authorized.”
B. F. Alford is out of the picture; in tbe Superior Court be was released. Tbe jury answered tbe first issue “Yes,” which is as follows: “Did tbe plaintiff sign tbe appeal bond in tbe case of Horne v. Gamer upon tbe promise and agreement of tbe defendant tbat be would indemnify and save tbe plaintiff harmless against any loss or damage by reason thereof ?”
Tbe interesting question so ably discussed by tbe attorneys on each side as to whether tbe above statute of frauds is applicable to tbe facts in tbis case, we do not think on tbis record it is necessary to decide.
Tbe jury answered tbe second issue “Yes,” which is as follows: “Did tbe plaintiff surrender bis landlord lien upon tbe crops of G. T. Garner to tbe defendant upon tbe promise and agreement of tbe defendant to indemnify and save tbe plaintiff harmless against any loss or damage by reason of bis surety upon tbe appeal bond in tbe case of Horne v. Garner as alleged?”
Tbe jury also answered tbat defendant was indebted to plaintiff in tbe amount of $200.
On tbe evidence adduced by tbe defendant tbe jury could have readily answered tbe second issue “No,” but did not do so, and answered it “Yes.” Tbis was entirely in their province.
Tbe finding on tbe second issue in favor of plaintiff is sufficient to support tbe judgment. Tbis Court will not ordinarily consider excep*679tions arising upon the trial of other issues “When one issue, decisive of appellant’s rights to recover has been found against him by the jury.” Ginsberg v. Leach, 111 N. C., 16; Lilly v. Cooperage Co., 194 N. C., at p. 254.
Was the evidence of plaintiff sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the second issue, and did plaintiff under the evidence have a cause of action against defendant? We think so. From the verdict of the jury, we consider only the evidence adduced by plaintiff.
As to whether plaintiff signing the bond of Garner at the request of Keel was such an obligation as to support a promise under the second issue, speaking to the subject, we find the law thus stated in 9 Cyc., 345, that “The compromise of a disputed claim may uphold a promise, although the demand was unfounded.” Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 186 N. C., at p. 214.
The plaintiff, W. P. Jennings, was the landlord; Garner the tenant; Home the subtenant; Alford the supply merchant. What were the rights of Jennings to the crops? C. S., 2355, is as follows: “When lands are rented or leased by agreement, written or oral, for agricultural purposes, or are cultivated by a cropper, unless otherwise agreed between the parties to the lease or agreement, any and all crops raised on said lands shall be deemed and held to be vested in possession of the lessor or his assigns at all times, until the rents for said lands are paid, and until all the stipulations contained in the lease or agreement are performed, or damages in lieu thereof paid to the lessor or his assigns, and until said party or his assigns is paid for all advancements made and expenses incurred in making and saving said crops. A landlord to entitle himself to the benefit of the lien herein provided for, must conform as to the prices charged for the advance to the provisions of the article Agricultural Liens, in the chapter Liens. This lien shall be preferred to all other liens, and the lessor or his assigns is entitled, against the lessee or cropper, or the assigns of either, who removes the crop or any part thereof from the lands without the consent of the lessor or his assigns, or against any other person who may get possession of said crop or any part thereof, to the remedies given in an action upon a claim for the delivery of personal property.” (Italics ours.)
It was in evidence on the part of plaintiff that he, Jennings, furnished Garner supplies through the time-merchant Alford and was responsible to Alford. Jennings under the law had a lien on all the crops raised on the land by Garner and his subtenant Horne. The crops raised on the land “shall be deemed and held to be vested in possession of the lessor,” etc., until the “rents” and “all advancements” made and expenses incurred in making and saving the crops. There was a claim and *680delivery taken out against Garner in respect to tbe crop. At tbat time tbe appeal of Garner witb Jennings as surety for $200, from tbe justice of tbe peace to Superior Court was pending. It was in evidence on tbe part of plaintiff tbat Garner, Jennings’ tenant, owed tbe defendant, Keel, some four or five hundred dollars, and they bad a meeting about tbe crop and tbe defendant Keel stated tbat be bad an agreement «with Garner to take up Garner’s account and Garner was to give bim one-balf of tbe crops over and above bis debts. Tbe defendant Keel gave three notes to plaintiff totalling some $2,670.37, which were paid. At tbat time tbe liability of plaintiff as surety on tbe $200 appeal bond was contingent on tbe recovery of Horne in tbe Superior Court against Garner.
This was tbe situation of tbe parties. Of course tbe premise of this decision is based on plaintiff’s evidence, which tbe jury accepted as true. Plaintiff testified: “Mr. Keel gave me tbe assurance to protect me against loss for tbe reason we were turning over collateral. Mr. Keel said it was unethical for bim to sign papers. Fix it up and I will save both of you from loss. Mr. Alford beard this. Upon that promise I surrendered my landlord’s lien.”
Tbe law applicable to tbe facts in this action is laid down in Whitehurst v. Hyman, citing numerous authorities, 90 N. C., p. 489-90: “It is settled by many judicial decisions in construing this statute, and others substantially like it, tbat where there is some new and original, consideration of benefit or barm moving between tbe party to whom tbe debt to be paid is due, and tbe party making tbe promise to pay tbe same, such case is not within tbe statute; as where a[ promise to pay an existing debt is made in consideration of property placed by the debtor in the hands of the party promising, or where the party to whom the promise is made relinquishes a levy on the goods of the debtor for the benefit of the promisor, or where the party promising has a personal interest, benefit or advantage of his own to be subserved, without regard to the interests or advantage of the original debtor; as, for example, if a creditor has a lien on certain property of his debtor to the amount of his debt, and a third person who has an interest in the same property promises the creditor to• pay the debt in consideration of the creditors relinquishing his lien. Such promises are not within the'Statute, because they are not made ’to answer the debt, default or miscarriage of another person.’ It may be, tbe performance of tbe promise will have tbe effect of discharging tbe original debtor; but such discharge was not tbe inducement to, or tbe consideration to support tbe promise. Tbe moving, controlling, purpose of tbe promisor in such case is bis own advantage, not tbat of tbe debtor. It not unfrequently happens tbat in a *681great variety of business circumstances it becomes important in a valuable sense to third parties to discharge the debt of a debtor, or relieve his property from liability to the creditor for the benefit of such third parties, without regard to the benefit, ease or advantage of the debtor. The advantage to the third party, the promisor, is a sufficient consideration to support a contract separate from, and independent of, the debt to be discharged.” (Italics ours.) Handle Co. v. Plumbing Co., 171 N. C., 495; Mercantile Co. v. Bryant, 186 N. C., 551.
For the reasons given, in the judgment below, there is
No error.