It has been held in S. v. Gibson, 169 N. C., 318, that it is an indictable offense under C. S., 4278, to procure a person to sign or endorse a note by means of false representation and with intent to cheat and defraud.
The constituent elements of the offense of false pretense are: (1) That the representation was made as alleged; (2) that property or something of value was obtained by reason of the representation; (3) that the representation was false; (4) that it was made with intent to defraud; (5) that it actually did deceive and defraud the person to whom it was made. S. v. Carlson, 171 N. C., 818.
The intent to defraud is one of the essential elements of the crime. S. v. McDonald, 133 N. C., 680. Thus in S. v. Garris, 98 N. C., 735, the Court said: “The essence of the indictment is in the imputed intent to deceive and defraud, and thereby to obtain the goods of the defrauded owner. Unless this intent exists, and is found, the offense is not com*508mitted, and can only be inferred from acts and declarations, and especially from such as occurred at the time of the committing of the alleged fraud. Whatever tends to show that the person charged acted under a misapprehension tends to repel the imputation, and becomes competent upon this inquiry. Much latitude must therefore be allowed in the reception of evidence bearing upon the issue of an intent to deceive and defraud, and we are not disposed to deny the competency of the rejected evidence, so far as it bears upon this point, and is not intended to vary or modify the terms of the written instrument.” In S. v. Walton, 114 N. C., 783, prior and subsequent transactions are held competent upon the question of intent. S. v. Murphy, 84 N. C., 742.
The defendant contended that the testimony showing that he confessed judgment upon said note and thereafter executed and delivered a bill of sale to the prosecuting witness and the other endorser of said note and turned over and delivered the property to them, was competent and admissible upon the question of his. intent to defraud. In our opinion this contention is sound and the evidence should have been admitted. We do not interpret the evidence so rejected as a mere attempt to reimburse the prosecuting witness. So far as the record discloses the judgment was confessed and the property turned over to the prosecuting witness, and the judgment canceled long before there was any suggestion of a criminal offense.
Upon the whole record, we are of the opinion that the defendant is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered.
New trial.