The Pender County Drainage District No. 4, was established prior to the enactment of chapter 7, Public Laws 1921. The provision of said statute “that the districts heretofore or hereafter created under the law shall be and constitute political subdivisions of the State” does not determine the nature of said district, at least for all purposes.
In O’Neal v. Mann, 193 N. C., 153, we said: “Whatever may have been the purpose of the General Assembly in enacting this statute, and thereby amending chapter 442, Public Laws 1909, it cannot be held to have affected the nature or character of a district established prior to its enactment.” The proceeding authorized by statute by which a drainage district may be organized and established is a judicial and not an administrative proceeding. The General Assembly is, therefore, without power, by the enactment of subsequent statutes, to affect vested rights of landowners acquired under orders, decrees or judgments made in such proceeding.
It is further said in O’Neal v. Mann, supra, that this Court has uniformly held in decisions sustaining the constitutionality of chapter 442, Public Laws 1909, as amended by subsequent statutes, that a drainage district, established by a proceeding in accordance with the provisions of said statute is not a municipal corporation, falling under the classification which includes counties,. cities or towns, school districts, or road districts; but that such district is a quasi-public corporation, created for private benefit. The primary purpose of such districts is the drainage of lands included therein for agricultural purposes; this is not a public purpose to be accomplished by a governmental agency. The decisions of this Court in support of this statement are cited in the *444opinion in that ease, in which it is held that a drainage district, upon its organization under chapter 442, Public Laws 1909, was not a public or municipal corporation, functioning as a governmental agency, within a political subdivision of the State.
The contention of appellees in the instant case that the appointment of a receiver for the Pender County Drainage District No. 4 is void, for that the court was without power to make such appointment, cannot be sustained. Whether or not -the Superior Court of this State has the power, by judgment or decree to dissolve a drainage district organized under the laws of this State, without special legislative authority, is not determinative of the question presented by this appeal. The relief sought in this action is, in part, that the bonds issued by the commissioners of the district, be declared null and void, and that they be delivered up and canceled for that reason. It cannot be held that the court was without power to appoint a receiver and to authorize and empower such receiver to take possession of and to hold such bonds, and all assets of the district, until the further orders of the court. Whether or not the orders appointing the receiver in this ca,se were erroneous is not presented by this appeal. If they are erroneous relief could have been had only by appeal to this Court, upon assignments of error based - on exceptions duly taken. If they are irregular, they could have been attacked only by motion in the cause. The record fails to disclose any irregularity in the orders, in that they were entered contrary to the course of practice of the Court.
The order made by Judge Devin, on the motion of appellees, that the orders signed by Judge Nunn, and Judge Bond, respectively, be vacated, on the ground that they are void, must be reversed. The authorities cited by appellees in their brief, filed in this Court, to the effect that a court is without power, in the absence of special legislative authority, to appoint a receiver for a municipal corporation, such as a county, city or town, áre not applicable in the instant case. A drainage district, organized under the statutes of this State is not a municipal corporation of the nature and character of a county, city or town.
The motion made before and heard by Judge Devin was in effect an appeal from the orders of Judge Nunn and Judge Bond. It is well settled by numerous decisions of this Court that no appeal lies from an order of one judge of the Superior Court to another. It has been held that this principle does not apply where the order is merely interlocutory, and not determinative of the rights of the parties. Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N. C., 427. When, however, the order is final, with respect to the matter involved, as in this case, the principle must be given full force, for otherwise we could not have an orderly administration of the law by the courts. Dockery v. Fairbanks-Morse Co., 172 N. C., 529; *445 Cobb v. Rhea, 137 N. C., 295; Cowles v. Cowles, 121 N. C., 276; Henry v. Hilliard, 120 N. C., 487; Alexander v. Alexander, 120 N. C., 474; May v. Lumber Co., 119 N. C., 98.
The sole question presented by tbis appeal is whether the order of Judge Devin was erroneous, as contended by appellants, for that he was without power to vacate the orders entered in the cause by Judge Nunn and Judge Bond. This question must be answered in accordance with the contention of appellants. The order is, therefore,
Reversed.