The defendant seeks to uphold the judgment of nonsuit upon two grounds: (1) The charter of the defendant provides that “no contract shall be binding upon the city unless it has been signed by the city manager and by a member of the city council, who shall have been duly authorized to sign the said contract by an ordinance adopted at a *45regular meeting of the city council,” etc. (2) The restriction upon the exercise of municipal powers contained in 3 C. S., 2960, subsection (d), is as follows, to wit: “Enter- into any contract involving the expenditure of money unless a sufficient appropriation shall have been made therefor, except a continuing contract to be performed in whole or in part in an ensuing fiscal year, in which case an appropriation shall be made sufficient to meet the amount to be paid in the fiscal year in which the contract is made.” In determining the merits of the first proposition, it appears that section 7 of the charter of defendant, enumerating the powers of the city manager provides as follows: “He shall sign all contracts ... as the city council may authorize and require.” Section 13, subsection (d) of the charter, enumerating the powers delegated to the city council, provides: “It shall make or authorize the making of all contracts, and no contract shall bind or be obligatory upon the city unless made by ordinance or resolution adopted by the city council, or reduced to writing and approved by said council or expressly authorized by ordinance or resolution adopted by the city council.” It is the plain intent and meaning of the sections of the charter referred to that all contracts shall be authorized by ordinance or resolution of the city council or approved by said council. In the case at bar, the resolution or ordinance employing the plaintiff was duly adopted by the governing body of defendant, reduced to wilting and duly approved in regular session assembled. The contract was signed by the city manager, the chief executive officer of the city, under the provisions of the charter. Under these circumstances the failure of a member of the council to sign the contract with the city manager was no more than an irregu-lárity or informality, which in nowise vitiates the contract if otherwise valid.
The more serious question presented by the record relates to the construction of 3 C. S., 2960, subsection (d). The Municipal Finance Act expressly repeals all acts, general, special, private or local, relating to bonds or other obligations of a municipality. So that the provisions of the city charter of defendant, with respect to its fiscal obligations, are superseded by the Municipal Finance Act. Subsection (d) of 2960, expressly prohibits a municipality from entering into any contract involving the expenditure of money unless a sufficient appropriation shall have been made therefor, unless such contract be a “continuing contract.” A continuing contract under the law is expressly excepted from the operation of said subsection (d). The vital point in the case, therefore, is whether or not the contract was a “continuing contract” as contemplated by law. A definition of a “continuing contract” depends largely upon the facts of particular cases. In Novelty Co. v. Andrews, 188 N. C., 59, the question of “continuing guaranty” was considered by this *46Court. Of course, a guaranty is a contract of a particular nature. Clarkson, J., quoted with approval the following principle of law: “Where by the terms of the guaranty it is' evident that the object is to give a standing credit to the principal to be used from time to time, either indefinitely or for a certain period, it is generally deemed a continuing guaranty. ... If the object of the guaranty is to enable the principal to have credit over an extended time, and to cover successive transactions, it is a continuing one.” The governing principle in such contracts is successive transactions between the parties over a definite or indefinite period of time. So in the present case, the contract between the parties contemplated successive transactions over an indefinite period of time. Indeed, the statute itself defines “continuing contract” as contemplated therein. Such a contract is one “to be performed in whole or in part in' an ensuing fiscal year.” The Municipal Finance Act provides that the fiscal year of every municipality shall begin either on the first day of June or the first day of September, as the governing body may determine. It appears, however, from the jiresent record that the fiscal year of defendant began on 1 May and ended 30 April. The contract was made by the defendant on 12 December, 1922. Hence this contract was made during the fiscal year and no appropriation could possibly have been made for the work in the budget which the law required to be presented not earlier than one month before nor later than one month after the beginning of each fiscal year. On 25 October, 1923, when the plans were ready to be submitted to the defendant another fiscal year had ensued. On 4 October, 1924, when the plaintiff rendered its bill for services, still another fiscal year had ensued. The evidence introduced at the trial was to the effect that the completion of the improvement would have required a period of eighteen months to two years, not including the time requisite for making preliminary studies, investigations, maps, sketches and detailed plans to be submitted to bidders. Obviously, under these circumstances, the contract in controversy contemplated the performance of services extending over a period of more than one fiscal year. Therefore, if the contract existing between the plaintiff and the defendant was a continuing contract, the failure of defendant to make an appropriation for the fiscal year 1922-23 did not affect the validity of the contract, for the reason that a continuing contract is expressly excepted from the operation of the restriction set forth in subsection (d), supra. In the event of a continuing contract the law expressly required the defendant to make an appropriation to meet the indebtedness so incurred.
Upon the present record we hold that the trial judge was in error in sustaining the motion of nonsuit, and said judgment is
Reversed.