The defendant pleaded fraud as a defense to the notes sued upon. There was no allegation and no evidence that there was fraud in the factum, but that certain oral representations made by the agent of the plaintiff at the time the contract was executed were false and fraudulent, and were made as an inducement to enter into the contract. Thereupon, at the trial the defendant offered evidence of certain representations made by the agent of the plaintiff with respect to the amount of carbide requisite for operating the machine. These oral representations amounted to no more than representation as to the cost of the operation of the machine. The trial judge excluded the evidence tendered, which ruling is the decisive point in the case. The contract was in writing, and the defendant could read. The express terms of the contract excluded oral representations of the nature defendant proposed to offer. “Having executed the contract, and no fraud appearing *346in the procurement of the execution, the court is without power to relieve the defendant on the ground that he thought it contained provisions which it does not. He is concluded thereby to the same extent as if he had known what due diligence would have informed him of, to wit, its plain provision that the agent had no authority to make agreements other than those contained therein, and that such agreements, if made, were not a part of the contract.” Parser, J., in Colt v. Kimball, 190 N. C., 169.
The oral declarations offered by the defendant were “promissory representations” looking to the future as to what could be done with the machine and as to the low cost of operation, and were in direct conflict with the juovisions of the contract which expressly excluded such declarations. Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N. C., 652; Pritchard v. Dailey, 168 N. C., 330; Colt v. Springle, 190 N. C., 229.
Upon the record we conclude that the ruling of the trial judge was correct, and the judgment is