C. S., 3949 (3), is as follows: “‘Month’ and ‘year.’ The word ‘month’ shall be construed to mean a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed; and the word ‘year,’ a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed; and the word ‘year’ alone shall be equivalent to the expression ‘year of our Lord.’ ”
The case of Rives v. Guthrie, 46 N. C., p. 84, was an action of slander. The question involved in that case was whether a statute which makes use of the word “months” meant a lunar or calendar month. The statute under construction provided that the action must be brought in six months. The same as the present statute, C. S., 444. At p. 85: “ ‘Month (in Saxon, Monath) is from Mona, the moon. In popular language, four weeks, or 28 days, are called a month, which consists of one revolution of the moon, or the period from one change or conjunction of the moon with the sun, to another’ — Webster's Dictionary. The calendar or almanac month, consisting of 28, 29, 30, and 31 days, is an arbitrary or artificial division of time, made to correspond with the 12 signs of the Zodiac.”
Nash, G. J., speaking to the subject in the Rives case, supra, at p. 86, said: “In deciding the question, our attention is naturally drawn to the history of the division of time into years, months, and weeks. The latter is of Divine institution, being the time employed by the Creator of all things, in the creation of the world, and marked by Him, by a command, to keep holy the seventh. The other two diyisions are of man’s invention. It was early discovered that they were necessary; observation pointed out that the apparent course of the sun around the earth occupied a period of a little more than three hundred and sixty-five days. The changes of the moon, which were observed to occur every twenty-eight days, naturally suggested the division of months. . . . The Julius Caasar system continued until 1582, when Gregory XIII introduced what is called the new style, and is still in use under the name of the new, or Gregorian Calendar.” The learned Chief Justice, after going into an interesting discussion as to man’s fixing time, held that the 6 months meant lunar months of 28 days under the common law, and the action was barred. This decision has been changed by the statutory construction above set forth. “Calendar year — The calendar year is *5composed of twelve months, varying in length according to tbe common or Gregorian Calendar. In re Parker’s Estate, 14 Wkly., Notes Cas. (Pa.), 566.” Black’s Law Die., p. 162. "Calendar year. Ordinarily and in common acceptation three hundred and sixty-five days, save leap year.” 9 C. J., at p. 1118. Muse v. Assurance Co., 108 N. C., p. 240. “Fiscal year. In the administration of a state or government, or of a corporation, the fiscal year is a period of twelve months (not necessarily concurrent with the calendar year), with reference to which its appropriations are made and expenditures authorized, and at the end of which its accounts are made up and the books balanced. See Moose v. State, 49 Ark., 499, 5 S. W., 885.” Black, supra, p. 502.
Plaintiff contends .that the tax year for ad valorem taxes is the calendar year of 1926, beginning 1 January, 1926, and ending 31 December, 1926. The court below construed the language of the statutes and sections to the effect that the tax year began on 1 May, 1926, and ended 30 April, 1927. In this we think the court correct.
C. S., 7987, says the “lien shall attach on the first day of June annually.” See, also, C. S., 2815. Carstarphen v. Plymouth, 186 N. C., p. 90.
The Revenue Act of 1925, which we are now construing, says “which lien shall attach on the first day of May annually.”
Chapter 101 is entitled “An act to raise revenue.” Section 1 is as follows: “The taxes hereinafter designated are payable in the existing national currency, and except as otherwise provided, shall be for the calendar year in which they become due. The lien of the State, county, and municipal taxes levied for any and all purposes in each year shall attach to all real estate of the taxpayer situated within the county or other municipality by which the tax list is placed in the sheriff’s or tax collector’s hands, which lien shall attach on the first day of May, annually, and- shall continue until such taxes, with any penalty and costs which shall accrue thereon, shall be paid.”
Chapter 102 is the “Machinery Act,” and relates “to the assessment of property and other purposes.” Article 3, section 44, is in part as follows: “Each township list-taker and assessor appointed under the authority of this act shall advertise in five or more public places within the township, not later than the twentieth day of April, notifying all taxpayers to return to him all real and personal property which each taxpayer shall own on the first day of May, and said return shall be made to the list-taker during the month of May under the pains and penalties imposed by law, and naming the times and places at which he will be present to receive tax lists.”
The governing bodies of each city or town — section 59 (3) — in part is as follows: “who shall be known as tax assessor, and who shall list *6 and cessess all the real and personal property in such city or town for the purposes o£ municipal taxation of said city or town, and in Mice manner as in this chapter provided for listing property by township or assistant assessors list the land in such city or town.”
Section 78 in part is as follows: “The taxes (ad valorem and poll) shall be due the first Monday in October in each year.”
Section 88 in part is as follows: “The sheriff or tax collector shall pay the county taxes to the county treasurer or other lawful officer. . . . On or before the first Monday of May in each year the sheriff shall account to the county treasurer or other lawful officer for all taxes due the county for the fiscal year.”
Construing these statutes and sections in pari materia — with reference to each other — the just interpretation, the spirit and right, would clearly indicate that the intent of the Legislature was, (1) That the tax year, twelve months, 365 days, for taxes levied on property in the county of Buncombe and city of Asheville (and in the State), during 1926, began on 1 May, 1926, and ended on 30 April, 1927. (2) The lien shall attach on the first day of May, the time fixed for the taxpayer to list his property for the ensuing year. The fiscal year for taxes began 1 May, 1926, and ended 30 April, 1927, the time is 12 months (365 days), same as the time of a calendar year. (3) The tax, although a lien from 1 May, is not due until the first Monday in October.
The learned judge in the court below, having had long years of experience on the bench, so construed the acts and sections. We think there is no error, and the judgment of the court below is ■
Affirmed.