The plaintiff does not expressly allege in the complaint that Piedmont Park was the result of a general plan or scheme of residential development. But conceding that the complaint, when liberally construed, amounts to such allegation, yet the history of conveyances of the property would indicate that there was no such general plan or scheme as the law contemplates. Indeed, upon facts similar to the facts of the present record,, this "Court held in Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C., 589, that Piedmont Park was not the result of a general and uniform plan, scheme or design. Upon the facts alleged in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer the question as to the general plan or scheme is a question of law rather than of fact. But if it be granted that Piedmont Park, upon the facts as presented in the record, is the result of a general plan or scheme for residential development, the question arises as to whether or not the restriction contained in the deeds of both plaintiffs and defendants prevents the erection of an apartment house by the defendants. The language of the restriction pertinent to the point involved in the case is as follows: “This conveyance is made upon condition that no owner of said real estate shall at any time hereafter erect upon said real estate any structure, except a dwelling-house. . . . And no owner of said real estate shall permit any building erected thereon to be used for other purposes than dwelling and necessary outhouses.”
*727The real question therefore is, whether or not this language excludes the erection of an apartment house.
The governing words in the restrictive covenant are “a dwelling-house.” “A dwelling-house is a house occupied as a residence, in distinction from a store, office, or other building.” Johnson v. Jones, 90 Atl., 649. In that case the restrictive covenant was in this language: “That nothing but a church or a dwelling-house, together with the outbuildings necessary for the convenience and comfort of the occupants thereof shall ever be erected upon- any part of the said land,” etc. A suit was brought to restrain the erection of apartment houses upon the land subject to said restriction. The Court said: “Not only does the proposed structure fall within the meaning of the term dwelling-house, as it is here implied, but in addition it may be said that, having regard to the purpose and object of the covenant as expressed in the agreement it in no way intervenes, at least so far as here appears.” In Satterthwait v. Gibbs, 135 Atl., 862, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a decision rendered 24 January, 1927, said: “It has been uniformly held that an apartment house is not a hotel, but is a building used as a dwelling for several families, each living separate and apart.” In Underwood v. Herman, 82 N. J. Equity, 358; 89 Atl., 21, the Court held that a two-family apartment house did not violate a restriction contained in a deed to the effect that no building other than a dwelling-house and its appropriate buildings should be erected upon the land. The New York Court of Appeals, in the case of Reformed Dutch Church v. Madison Avenue Building Co., 214 N. Y., 268; 108 N. E., 444; L. R. A., 1915 F, 651, considered the question as to whether an apartment house was a dwelling-house within the meaning of a restriction providing in substance that no owner of a lot should erect thereon any building or erection other than brick or stone dwelling-houses of at least two stories in height, etc. The Court said: “The precise question is whether an apartment house will be a ‘dwelling-house’ within the meaning of this provision, for there is no objection to the form, style, character, or construction of the proposed building other than that it is to be an apartment house accommodating many families, instead of a dwelling-house intended for occupation by a single family.
“It seems very clear that the simple term ‘dwelling-house’ used in this covenant is broad enough to include and permit an apartment house. "We require little aid from dictionaries or decisions to enable us to see that, within the ordinary meaning of language, a ‘dwelling-house’ is a house or structure in which people dwell, and such, concededly, are the character and purpose of an apartment house. There is no way in which we can fairly engraft upon these particular words, considered by themselves, any further limitations of definition which would make a *728structure used for ordinary dwelling purposes more or less a dwelling-house merely because of the number of people who dwelt in it.. I think that the appellant really concedes this, but it urges upon us that the words 'dwelling-house’ in this particular case are to be interpreted as though they were 'private dwelling-house,’ thereby meaning a building designed for occupation by one family only, and in which case the term doubtless could exclude an apartment house. ... In conclusion, it may be stated that there is no lack of appreciation of the sentiments of those residents of this district who have become attached to it as one of a private residential character, and who are anxious to preserve it against the inroads of more public or business purposes. There must, however, be considered the rights of those who desire or feel compelled to devote their property to such latter uses, and who have an absolute right to invoke the principle that they may thus do, unless such right has been clearly restricted by some binding covenant or limitation, and this, as we have held, does not exist against the present proposed use of the respondent’s lot.” The authorities bearing upon the subject are referred to in 27 R. C. L., secs. 524, 525; Bolin v. Investment Co., L. R. A., 1918 C, 869; Hunt v. Held, 90 Ohio St., 280; 107 N. E., 765; Ann. Cas., 1915 A, 419.
The plaintiffs rely upon the case of Bailey v. Jackson, 191 N. C., 61. In that ease, Adams, J., speaking for the Court, said: “By a critical examination of the record and the authorities we are satisfied that an apartment house is not a residence in contemplation of the several restrictive covenants set out in the various deeds.” The restrictive clause pertinent to the point in controversy was as follows: “Will not build more than one residence on either lot of said land.” The fundamental difference between the restriction in the Bailey case and the restriction in the instant case is obvious. One residence on each of said lots is essentially a more contracted term than the expression, “a dwelling-house.” ^ We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the erection of an apartment house upon the land in controversy, as proposed by defendants, is not prohibited by the restrictive covenants in the deeds under which the parties hold title.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the Satterthwait case, supra, has well said: “Covenants restricting the use of land are construed more strictly against the one claiming their benefit and in favor of free and unrestrained ,use of property; violation of covenant occurs only when there is a plain disregard of the limitation imposed by its express words.”
The judgment is
Affirmed.