There are seven exceptions appearing in the record. The first exception is to the following question and answer: “How *320soon after be was arrested?” (wben State’s witness identified defendant) A. “Next morning.”
This exception is without merit, because the identity of defendant was one of the main questions in the case, and the fact that the officer testified that the “State’s witness identified the defendant soon after he was arrested was corroborative of the evidence of the State’s witness, Mrs. Griffin, who testified that she did identify the defendant at the jail the next morning after he was arrested.
The second exception was to the following question and answer in reference to the physical condition of prosecutrix immediately after the assault: “Did she complain?” .A. “Yes; she said she could hardly sit up.”
This evidence was competent to prove that an assault had actually been committed. Certainly, if the State’s witness had not been assaulted, there was no crime, and the proof of a crime was an essential part of the State’s case.
Therefore, the bodily condition of Mrs. Griffin was competent. “Whenever the bodily or mental feelings or condition of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expression of such feelings are admissible as original evidence.” S. v. Hargrave, 97 N. C., 457; Sherrill v. Tel. Co., 117 N. C., 353; Lockhart’s Hand Book of Evidence, sec. 209; Howard v. Wright, 173 N. C., 339.
The third and fifth exceptions are taken because of the refusal of the trial judge to nonsuit the case. These exceptions cannot be sustained. The defendant was positively identified by the prosecutrix, who also testified that he was the man who had assaulted her. It was, therefore, necessary to submit the case to the jury.
The fourth exception is to the following question asked the defendant on cross-examination: “Why didn’t you ask that man out at Mordecai what he wanted you for and what did they arrest you on Hills-boro street one time for?” This exception cannot be sustained. The question was for the purpose of impeaching the witness and was therefore competent. S. v. Lawhorn, 88 N. C., 634; S. v. Holder, 153 N. C., 606; S. v. Winder, 183 N. C., 776.
The sixth exception is to the refusal of the trial judge to give the following instruction: “That evidence of the good character of a witness for defendant, introduced to establish an alibi, shall be not only considered as affecting the credibility of such witness, but as substantive evidence of the truth of the alibi relied upon by the defendant.” The court properly declined to give this instruction. In no aspect of the law could evidence as to the good character of a witness tend to prove that a defendant or some other person was not at a particular place at a particular time. The purpose of character evidence is to enable *321tbe jury to place tbe proper estimate upon tbe testimony of a witness. S. v. Cloninger, 149 N. C., 567; S. v. Morse, 171 N. C., 777.
Tbe seventh exception is as follows: “That it was tbe duty of tbe court to charge tbe jury that, defendant having relied upon an alibi, tbe burden was upon tbe State to show conclusively and decisively that tbe defendant was tbe person that committed tbe offense, and that be was present at tbe time and place when said offense was committed. And tbe court erred in charging the jury that upon tbe evidence in tbe case tbe jury would be justified in finding that some other than defendant committed tbe offense. There was no admission on part of defendant or bis counsel that would give weight to this charge by bis Honor.” This is a broadside exception to tbe charge of tbe court without specifying any particular error. •
We have examined tbe charge of tbe court with great care, and this examination discloses that tbe charge presented every phase of defendant’s defense, fully and impartially, and is free from legal error.
Tbe alibi of the defendant was strong and supported by witnesses of good character, and, upon tbe evidence offered in bis behalf, if believed, be was not guilty. But tbe weight of tbe evidence is for tbe jury and not for tbe court. Tbe jury, upon competent evidence, has convicted tbe defendant of a capital offense, and tbe judgment as a matter of law must be upheld.
No error.