Hearsay evidence is such as does not derive its value solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but rests in part on the veracity and competency of some other person. No rule is more firmly established than that which excludes evidence of this character; but to this, as to most other general rules, there are some exceptions. One of these exceptions relates to marriage. In Morgan v. Purnell, 11 N. C., 95, 97, it is said: “Common reputation in the family is admissible as evidence of a marriage in that family; and it is said that the declarations of an individual of that family are evidence of that common reputation.” Two years afterwards it was held that this principle does not apply to.actions from criminal conversation (Weaver v. Cryer, 12 N. C., 337) and the latter ruling was followed in Jones v. Reddick, 79 N. C., 290. In Archer v. Haithcock, 51 N. C., 421, Pearson, G. J., said: “It is held to be a general rule that reputation, cohabitation, and the declarations and conduct of the parties are competent evidence of a marriage between them, except in two cases, i. e., on an indictment for bigamy and in an action of Trim, con.’ ” Bigamy is made an “exception to the exception” also in Turner v. Battle, 175 N, C., 219, 222. Whether the indictment be treated as a charge of bigamy, bigamous cohabitation, or criminal conversation, mere rumors or neighborhood reports are not admissible in evidence. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 132 N. C., 25, 30; S. v. Holly, 155 N. C., 485. The defendant’s objection to the evidence should have been sustained and for this reason there must be a
New trial.-