Tbe first two questions presented to tbe court below are tbe question as to tbe patrol wagon fee and tbe question as to tbe costs taxed in cases 5619 and 5620, baying been decided in favor of plaintiff, and the defendant having neither excepted to tbe judgment nor appealed therefrom, neither of these matters is now presented to this Court for review. And it having been agreed that all other items entering into tbe bills of costs were properly taxed, there is no question presented tó this Court, as to tbe validity of any individual item of costs. The sole question, therefore, presented by this appeal is whether of tbe whole costs taxed in tbe 21 cases (exclusive of tbe two items amounting to $2, which it is agreed were not properly taxed in No. 5620), tbe county is liable for tbe whole, $243.70, or for only one-balf, $121.85. Tbe plaintiff bases its contention that tbe county of Guilford is *588liable for tbe whole of said costs on the provisions of the act creating the municipal court — chapter 651 of the Public Laws of 1909. The defendant bases its contention that the county of Guilford is liable for only one-half of said costs on the provisions of C. S., 1259.
We quote the general principles of law bearing on the subject: In 25 R. C. L., p. 929, sec. 118, it is said: “It is well settled that a special or local law repeals an earlier general law to the extent of any irreconcilable conflict between their provisions, or speaking more accurately, it operates to engraft on the general statute an exception to the extent of the conflict.
In S. v. Kelly, 186 N. C., p. 371, it is said: “ ‘Where two statutes are thus in conflict and cannot reasonably be reconciled, the latter one repeals the one of earlier date to the extent of the repugnance.’ Comrs. v. Henderson, 163 N. C., 120; Road Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202. ‘Between the two acts there must be plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable repug-nancy, and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy.’ 36 C. L. P., p. 1047. Every affirmative statute is a repeal by implication of a prior affirmative statute, so far as it is contrary to it, for the maxim is leges posteriores priores contraries abrogant (later laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary to them). S. v. Woodside, 31 N. C., 500; Black’s Law Dictionary.” Felmet v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 252; Waters v. Comrs., ibid., 721; Blair v. Comrs., 187 N. C., 489; Carr v. Little, 188 N. C., 111; Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N. C., 732.
C. S., 1259, is as follows: “If there is no prosecutor in a criminal action, and the defendant is acquitted, or convicted and unable to pay the costs, or a nolle prosequi is entered, or judgment arrested, the county shall pay the clerks, sheriffs, constables, justices and witnesses one-half their lawful fees; except in capital cases and in prosecutions for forgery, perjury, or conspiracy, when they shall receive full fees. No county shall pay any such costs unless the same is approved, audited and adjudged against the county as provided in this chapter.”
This payment by the county of half fees has been the general policy of the State for long years. In Guilford v. Comrs., 120 N. C., p. 23, decided as far back as 1897, this act was construed and it is there said: “At common law the sovereign never paid or recovered costs.”
The municipal court of the city of Greensboro was established by chap. 651, Public Laws 1909. Sec. 23 is as follows: “That whenever under a judgment of the said court any defendant is sentenced to the common jail of the county of Guilford to work on the public roads or in the county workhouse of said county, or to pay a fine and the costs of the action, or the costs only, as provided in this act, and said defendant is imprisoned in the common jail aforesaid, and assigned to the public *589roads or tbe county workbouse of said county as aforesaid, for tbe purpose of working out said fine and costs, or tbe costs only, as tbe ease may be, and sucb judgment is carried into effect, tbe said county of Guilford shall be liable for and shall pay to tbe treasurer of tbe city of Greensboro tbe amount of tbe costs taxed in said case.” Tbe other sections of tbe act we do not think throw light on tbe subject and need not be considered.
When this section of tbe Municipal Court Act was enacted tbe general State law was to tbe effect that counties in criminal actions were only liable for “one-half their lawful fees,” except in certain cases not material here. With this public act in force applicable to tbe whole State, — tbe Municipal Court Act — a special act was passed “tbe said county of Guilford shall be liable for and shall pay to tbe treasurer of tbe city of Greensboro tbe amount of tbe costs taxed in said case.” Does this language make an irreconcilable conflict with tbe general State act ? If it does, under tbe decisions of this State, it is an exception, and tbe county would be liable for full costs. But we cannot so bold. If tbe Legislature bad intended that tbe county pay full fees, it could have said so and clearly made an exception. Tbe general law in existence was that a county was liable to pay only “one-half their lawful fees,” and that was all that could be taxed against a county. Between tbe two acts there must be plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable repugnancy. It is apparent that there is not sucb a conflict and tbe two acts should be construed in pari materia. Asheville v. Herbert, supra, p. 732. “Tbe amount of tbe cost taxed” means tbe costs tbe law allows to be taxed against a county, which is one-balf. To make an exception, tbe language should be clear and not ambiguous. If it was tbe intention of tbe Legislature to make an exception from tbe general statute, it could have easily said that tbe county should be liable for full fees or used other appropriate language showing an unmistakable intent.
Tbe judgment of tbe court below is
Affirmed.