It is conceded in the briefs of the parties that the rule in' Shelley's case is not involved for the reason that the superadded words “equally divided between the lawful begotten heirs of her body” bar its application. Ward v. Jones, 40 N. C., 400; Mills v. Thorne, 95 N. C., 362; Jones v. Whichard, 163 N. C., 244; Haar v. Schloss, 169 N. C., 228; Blackledge v. Simmons, 180 N. C., 535.
Therefore, Martha L. Williams, the grantee in the deed, took thereunder a life estate only with remainder to be “equally divided between the lawful begotten heirs of her body,” it being further provided that “at her death to go into the hands of Daniel B. Newton as special trustee for the lawful begotten heirs of her body, and' for him, as they become 21 years old, to divide and hand over to them as the law directs in all such cases, all the above named property.” It is manifest that the words “lawful begotten heirs of her body” are not employed to designate an entire class to take in succession from generation to generation or used in a technical sense, but rather as a mere descriptio personarum. Hence, the words “lawful begotten heirs of her body” should be construed as children. This interpretation is further reinforced and established by the language of the deed itself, and particularly the following clause thereof, “only to be used by her husband for the special benefit of herself and children during her natural life, etc.” Puckett v. Morgan, 158 N. C., 344; Bizzell v. Loan Association, 112 N. C., 159; Albright v. Albright, 172 N. C., 351; Kornegay v. Cunningham, 174 N. C., 209; Pugh v. Allen, 179 N. C., 307; Blackledge v. Simmons, 180 N. C., 535.
Under this construction Martha R. Williams, the grantee in the deed, would take a life estate with remainder to her children to be equally divided as they become 21 years old.
The vital question immediately arises: “Is the remainder vested or contingent ?” If contingent, the will of Mollie Williams who predeceased the life tenant, Martha L. Williams, is ineffectual, and the plaintiff, Bessie L. Sasser, takes nothing thereunder. If the remainder is vested, Bessie L. Sasser took under said will the one-eighth interest of Mollie L. Williams in said land.
The contention of the defendants that the remainder is contingent rests upon the theory that only the children of the life tenant who *457survive ber will take an interest in tbe property. They rely upon tbe decisions of Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N. C., 705; Bowen v. Hackney, 136 N. C., 187; Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C., 1; James v. Hooker, 172 N. C., 780; Mercer v. Downs, ante, 203. In all of these cases there were words of survivorship or words importing survivor-ship in the instrument creating the estate, and these words of survivor-ship were construed as referring to the death of the life tenant as the time for ascertaining or designating the parties entitled to the property. There is no such language in the deed of Daniel L. Harper.
In Power Co. v. Haywood, 186 N. C., 313, the question as to whether the remainder was vested or contingent was fully discussed by Adams, J. It was the sole question for decision. The distinction between vested and contingent remainders was thus expressed: “The present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession were to become vacant, and not the certainty that the possession will become vacant before the estate limited in remainder determines, universally distinguishes a vested remainder from one that is contingent.” In that case the devise was “to William, during his natural life, and at his death to his eldest son; but if he should die leaving no son surviving him, then I give said plantation to my children, to be equally divided between them.” Thereafter William James Boylan was born to the life tenant, William Boylan, and died during his father’s lifetime, and therefore before the life estate terminated. Continuing the discussion, Justice Adams says further: “Guided by the foregoing authorities and others which are not cited, we are unable to concur in the argument that the vesting of the remainder was dependent on the decease of the life tenant during the life of the remainderman.”
In Witty v. Witty, 184 N. C., 375, it appeared that Levi Witty- died in January, 1872, devising his land to his wife, Louisa Witty, for life, and at her death, or if -she married again, the land was to be sold at public auction and the proceeds to be divided equally among “my lawful heirs.” At the time of his death the testator was survived by five children, all of whom died before the death of the life tenant. E. M. Witty, one of the children of the testator, died before his mother, the life tenant, devising his interest in the land to his wife, Mrs. E. M. Witty, for life, with remainder to his adopted 'son, Mark Witty, Jr. Stacy, J., says: “It is provided that the remainder after the life estate is to be divided equally among ‘my lawful heirs,’ simpliciter,' and this imports a division among those who were the heirs of the testator at the time of his death, and who took in right at that time, though they were not to come into actual possession and enjoyment until the previous benefit, intended for their mother, should terminate by her death.”
*458And further, “the fact that the direction is to sell the realty at the expiration of the preceding particular estate and to divide the proceeds derived therefrom ordinarily would not affect the general rule as to when the remainder is to vest.”
The various shades of definition and distinguishing marks of vested and contingent remainders are fully discussed and classified in the May-wood case and the Witty case. These cases summarize and gather up in clear expression the principles reaffirmed in a long line of decisions from Brinson v. Wharton, 43 N. C., p. 80, to the present time. Under the authority of the reasoning in these cases we hold that Mollie L. "Williams took a vested remainder in the land, and that therefore her will conveying her interest to Bessie L. Sasser was effectual to transfer her interest to the said Bessie L. Sasser.
While it is true that the deed provided that at the death of the .life tenant the land was to be held by a trustee until the remainderman should arrive at 21 years of age, this fact does not affect the principle regulating the time of vesting of the estate in the remainderman. It simply postponed the time of enjoyment. 23 R. C. L., 529; Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C., 1; Bank v. Ballard, 83 Ky., 481; Tayloe v. Mosher, 29 Md., 443; Schofield v. Alcott, 11 N. E., 357; L. R. A., 1918-E., 1127.
Holding, therefore, as we do, that Mollie L. Williams took a vested remainder, the judgment must be
Reversed.