Robert Crozier, father of tbe defendants, acquired title to tbe lot in question on 11 January, 1880. Tbe county road, represented on tbe plat as tbe “old road,” extended through this lot; and it appears from tbe decree reforming tbe deed executed by Crozier to George H. Harris tbat tbe lot conveyed to Ha-rris lies between and is bounded by tbe railroad’s right of way, tbe county road, and tbe land owned by Allgood. It will be noted tbat tbe county road — “tbe old road”- — is thus made one of tbe boundary lines of tbe plaintiff’s lot. It does not definitely appear when this road was established, but tbe public acquired an easement in it and in tbe absence of evidence to tbe contrary we assume tbat tbe title in fee remained as it was before tbe road was opened and rests finally in tbe defendants. Tbe general rule is tbat when tbe owner of land lying on both sides of a public road conveys tbe land on one side tbe boundary is tbe line extending along tbe middle of tbe road, but tbe rule must be applied in tbe light of tbe intention of tbe parties. It is not necessary to determine tbe question of intention in this instance. If tbe defendants are concluded by a legal appropriation of tbe land covered by tbe old road they have no right to interfere with tbe plaintiff’s reasonable use of bis property.
*298The old road extended over land conveyed by Vaughan to Crozier in 1880 and was used as a public road from that time until the date of the change made by the Highway Commission in 1922. The method by which the easement was originally acquired- — whether by dedication or the exercise of the power of eminent domain — is not clearly disclosed by the record. In any event the defendants contend that the old road has been abandoned and that the defendants as the owners of the fee may appropriate the road to their own use.
Summarized, the argument of the defendants is this: the alteration of the public road by the construction of a part of it in a different place where it will serve the same purpose was to this extent a discontinuance of the old road; that the road was taken over by the Highway Commission and altered; and that this was an implied vacation or discontinuance of the old road.
¥e fail to find in the record any express order vacating the old road. Certainly the conversation of the engineer with the defendants cannot be construed as an order of the commission for whom he was at work. It was at most a mere expression of his opinion, for he stated that he did not attempt to determine the question of title. And the minutes of the county commissioners, offered in evidence, were simply an approval of the highway system for Vance County, entered of record before the roads were actually taken over.
The defendants cite 37 Cyc., 174; 15 A. & E., 404; Bradberry v. Walton, 94 Ky., 167, as authority for the position that the alteration of an existing road operates as a discontinuance of such portions of the old road as are not embraced within the limits fixed for the new one. An examination of the authorities has failed to disclose any decision to this effect under facts similar to those in the record before us. Neither secs. 3846 and 3846j nor Honeycutt v. Comrs., 182 N. C., 321, is decisive as to this position.
We deem it unnecessary, however, definitely to pass upon this point, for there is another principle by which the controversy may be determined. Dedication may be established against the owner of the soil by showing that he has sold lots describing them as bounded by a street or road. The authorities to this effect are numerous. 1 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 3 ed., sec. 128, and cases cited; Herold v. Investment Co., 14 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1067; Douglass v. Land Co., 37 L. R. A. (N. S.), 953, and note; Green v. Miller, 161 N. C., 25; Haggard v. Mitchell, 180 N. C., 255.
True, such dedication may be found most frequently in case of streets, parks, and other open spaces within municipal corporations; but the underlying principle is that of common law dedication operating by way of estoppel in pais rather than by grant. 1 Elliott, supra, sec. 125. *299Tbe lot in suit is outside tbe corporate limits but adjacent thereto and tbe old road is a continuation of tbe main street of tbe city. Tbe principle upon wbicb we base our decision is that of equitable estoppel.
Tbe deed from Robert Crozier to George H. Harris conveyed through mistake tbe entire lot described in tbe deed from Yaugban to Orozier. In 1907, tbe mistake was corrected by a decree of tbe Superior Court, in wbicb by consent of parties it was adjudged and decreed that tbe defendant Isabella Carter was tbe owner of,so much of said land as was situated on tbe west side of tbe old road and that tbe conveyance to Harris should be limited to such part of tbe lot as was bounded by tbe railroad right of way, tbe old county road, and tbe land owned by Allgood. We do not say that tbe conveyance of tbe lot to Harris, in wbicb it is described as bounded by tbe road necessarily constitutes a common law dedication; but we are of opinion that by virtue of tbe consent decree, tbe boundary of tbe defendants’ lot and of tbe lot conveyed to George H. Harris, and tbe buildings erected and tbe business conducted there, tbe defendants are equitably estopped from obstructing tbe old road and thereby seriously impairing tbe value of tbe plaintiff’s lot and interfering with tbe business conducted thereon.
It is important to remember that tbe controversy is confined to tbe parties plaintiff and defendant. Apparently tbe public is not interested. Neither tbe Highway Commission nor tbe board of county commissioners is a party. We conclude only tbe parties and those in privity with them.
We find
No error.