Tbe clerk made an order extending tbe time for filing tbe answer, but not to a day certain, as tbe statute requires. Public Laws 1921, Extra Session, cb. 92, sec. 1 (3). After tbe statutory time for filing tbe answer bad expired, tbe clerk permitted tbe answer to be filed, and tbe plaintiff excepted. Tbe case was tben transferred to tbe civil issue docket.
Whether tbe clerk’s order extending tbe time for answering without naming a “day certain” was invalid or merely irregular we need not now determine. In tbe Superior Court tbe plaintiff twice procured a continuance of tbe cause; and upon tbe facts appearing in tbe record whether tbe answer should have been retained or stricken from tbe file was a matter addressed to tbe sound discretion of tbe presiding judge. In McNair v. Yarboro, 186 N. C., 111, it is held that tbe restrictions referred to do not and were not intended to impair tbe broad powers conferred on tbe judge by section 536 of tbe Consolidated Statutes: “Tbe judge may likewise, in bis discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, allow an answer or reply to be made, or other act to be done, after tbe time limited, or by an order to enlarge tbe time.”
Tbe judgment is