Tbe principle is established tbat in arriving at a verdict it is tbe duty of tbe jury to consider and determine tbe rights of the parties by exercising tbe judgment, weighing tbe evidence, and applying tbe law to tbe facts as found in every case. It is also held tbat a verdict is invalid if it appears to be more nearly tbe result of a mathematical calculation than of an exercise of judgment based on tbe evidence. There seems to be no satisfactory or practical distinction between a case in wbicb tbe jurors agree to accept one-twelfth ’ of tbe aggregate amount of their several estimates without further deliberation and a case in wbicb they agree arbitrarily to award 30 per cent of tbe plaintiffs’ demands apparently without due regard to tbe evidence in each case. This becomes more manifest upon a consideration of tbe verdict *183in the light of the evidence. Castelloe v. Jenkins, 186 N. C., 166, 173; S. v. Snipes, 185 N. C., 743, 747. The ratio wbicb the acreage bears to the several demands is not uniform; the character of the crops varies; similarity in point of cultivation does not appear. The verdict was manifestly the result of a mathematical calculation not governed by the proper esercise of judgment under the fixed rules of the law. Ottowa v. Gilliland, 88 A. S. R., 232; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 134 A. S. R., 1061; Note 16 Ann. Cas., 910; Note Ann. Cas., 1917, ch. 1224.
The order setting aside the verdict is
Affirmed.